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At the end of the 1980s the communist systems in East-Central Europe
were falling apart. Many commentators predicted that the new emerging
democracies in East-Central Europe would soon be entering an era of
extensive constitutional transformation.1 The only question for these
* Professor of Law and Director of the Comparative and International Law
Institute at the Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D.C.
1 This article covers the countries of the region of former Soviet dominance which
either adopted new constitutions or seriously advanced the process of constitutional
reform. Initial research for this article has been done for the author's book, RErr R.
LUDWNKOWSKI, CoNSTrrUTION-MAKING IN THE REGION OF FORMER SOVIET
DOMINANCE (1996). Some findings from these earlier studies are incorporated or
summarized in this article; it builds on them, updates their results and reports on the
new developments in the region up until the beginning of 1997. In contrast to the
book, however, this article does not focus on the constitutional reform in particular
postsocialist countries, but tries to give the reader an overview and general evaluation
of the process of constitution-making in the region as a whole.
The process of this transformation has been examined by this author in several
articles preceding this publication. See, e.g., Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitution
Making in the Countries of Former Soviet Dominance: Current Developments, 23 GA.
J. INT'L & CoMT. L. 155 (1993); Rett R. Ludwikowski, Searching for a New
Constitutional Model for East-Central Europe, 17 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 91
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commentators was which constitutional models the new democracies
would look to for guidance.
Most commentators believed that the inexperienced constitutional
drafters from the former Soviet bloc would borrow from the well-tested
Western constitutional models in transforming their own. Although these
drafters had all lived in socialist countries with common core
constitutions, they were familiar with several Western constitutional
models which might be considered for adoption.2 While accepting that
the new constitutions would still contain some socialist flavor, most
commentators agreed that the new democracies would be reluctant to
continue their socialist traditions. Thus, an open question existed as to
what extent the liberal traditions of America, Britain, France, Germany
or Eastern Europe would bear on the adoption of a constitutional model
that would best fit the needs of the postcommunist states.
Today, after almost a decade of experimenting with constitutional
drafting, the East-Central European states have fulfilled few of the
commentator's preconceived expectations. No doubt, the region of
former Soviet dominance has become a major laboratory of
constitutional works.3 Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgzystan, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia and the Ukraine have adopted entirely new
constitutions. Amendments introduced to the Hungarian constitution
purged it almost entirely of the remnants of its Stalinist legacy, and the
Albanians have produced an interim constitution. No single model,
however, has come to dominate the constitutional landscape of East-
Central Europe. Rather, the constitutional drafters of this region
borrowed free-handedly from western and socialist traditions, and
produced "mixed" constitutions which are an amalgam of many well-
known models.
(1991); Rett R. Ludwikowski, Judicial Review in the Socialist Legal Systems: Current
Development, 37 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 89 (1988).
2 The most frequently examined were the presidential model, the parliamentary
and parliamentary-cabinet model, the chancellor's model and the semi-presidential
model. See KONSTYTUCYZNE SYSTEMY RzADow: MOZLIwoscI ADAPTAcI DO
WARLUNKow PoLsKicH (Constitutional Systems of Government: The Chances for
Adoption in the Polish Conditions) (Michael Domagala ed., 1997).
3 Jon Elster referred to this phenomenon as a final wave of constitution making,
preceded by several other waves: the first wave occurred between 1780-1791 with
various American states, Poland and France adopting their first constitutions; the
second wave occurred during the period of the 1848 revolutions in Europe; the third
wave occurred after World War I; the fourth following World War II; the fifth during
the disintegration of the French and British Empires; the sixth, occurring in Southern
Europe, after the fall of dictatorial regimes during the second half of the 1970s in
Portugal, Greece and Spain. See Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the
Constitution-Making Process, 45 DuKE L.J. 364, 368-69 (1995).
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Some question still remains, however, as to how these new
constitutions will work and whether they are the products of mature legal
engineering or the results of nonprofessional constitutional drafting. This
Article attempts to answer these questions.
Thus, Part I of this Article discusses the difficulties involved in
attempting to classify the new constitutions using traditional criteria. Part
II examines the processes involved in the adoption of the various
components of existing constitutional models into the constitutions of the
East-Central European states, including separate analysis of the
distributions of power, the structures of the legislatures, the electoral
systems, the systems of governance and mechanisms of judicial
enforcement provided by these instruments. Finally, Part III makes
observations and draws conclusions regarding the processes examined in
Part II.
I. CLASSIFYING CONsTrruTIONS: "PURE" AND "MIXED"
CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS
The dissemination of the constitutional experience during the nine-
teenth century encouraged the classification of constitutions. The consti-
tutional experts of this period tried to define the term constitution as a
body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sover-
eignty are exercised.4 In the process of attempting to define what a con-
stitution was, the experts concluded that, in a sense, every state had a
constitution, although few had well defined constitutions organized in
written form. Thus, constitutions were initially classified as written and
unwritten. Thomas Cooley attempted to clarify this traditional distinc-
tion in 1880, commenting, "a constitution may be written or unwritten. If
unwritten, there may still be laws or authoritative documents which
declare some of its important principles; as we have seen has been and is
still the case of England."5
While stating the obsolete criteria of constitutional classification, Coo-
ley implied that this was an ineffective distinction. The "written" charac-
ter of a constitution meant only that the country had a single, framework
document determining the government's forms and functions. And
although unwritten constitutions were "subject to perpetual change at the
will of the law-making power,"6 the so-called "written constitutions" were
similarly subject to a body of implementing laws, interpretations, court
decisions, and constitutional practices.7
4 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
IN THE UNrIED STATES OF AMEmCA 22 (Andrew C. McLaughlin ed., Little Brown &
Co. 1898).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 22.
7 Id. at 23.
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By the end of the nineteenth century, the traditional classification
between written and unwritten constitutions became the subject of fur-
ther scholarly criticism.8 James Bryce proposed a new classification of
constitutions, consisting of the "flexible" and the "rigid." The former
were to be "promulgated or repealed in the same way as ordinary laws," 9
while the latter were to "stand above the other laws of the country which
they regulate[d]."'" Bryce's criteria for distinguishing among constitu-
tions was itself, in turn, challenged on a number of grounds." Critics
initially noted that by Bryce's definitions, both types of constitutions
shared identical features, most notably stability. 2 Furthermore, although
an opponent of the ineffective traditional written-unwritten classification,
Bryce himself had difficulty distinguishing between flexible and unwritten
constitutions. 3 Finally, Bryce's admission of the rigidity of almost all
constitutions adopted at that time led Kenneth C. Wheare to comment
that "a system of classification which places almost all the Constitutions
of the world in one category of 'rigid' and leaves only one or two in the
other cannot take us very far.' ' 4
Several scholars proposed alternative criteria. Wheare, reinforcing
some of Bryce's language, suggested using the terms "rigid" and "flexi-
ble," "not according to whether or not the constitutions require for their
amendment a special procedure which is not required for ordinary laws,
but according to whether they are in practice ... easily and often altered
or not."15 Leslie Wolf-Phillips attempted to reconcile the scholarly desire
to classify constitutions with more pragmatic considerations, claiming that
"no constitution will be completely 'written' or completely 'unwritten,'
completely 'codified' or completely 'uncodified,' completely 'rigid' or
completely 'flexible.' The aim will be to establish the degree of the classi-
ficatory attribute."' 6 Other criteria of constitutional classifications were
subjected to similar criticism. For example, the attempt to classify consti-
tutions as those which incorporated or rejected the concept of the divi-
sion of powers proved unworkable. While most modem constitutions
8 Some of the comments below are taken from the chapter "Comparative
Flexibility of the New Constitutions" of the author's book. See generally
LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 215-18.
9 JAMES BRYCE. CONSTITUTIONS 8 (photo. reprint 1980) (1905).
10 Id.
11 For a summary of the main threads of the definitional discourse see K.C.
WHEARE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 16 (1966); (Leslie Wolf-Phillips ed., 1968).
CONSTITUTIONS OF MODERN STATES iX-X.
12 See BRYCE, supra note 9, at 21, 66.
13 See id. at 46-53.
14 WHEARE, supra note 11, at 16.
15 Id. at 17.
16 WOLF-PHLLYPS, supra note 11, at xii (emphasis in original).
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recognized this doctrine," the differing needs of individual states meant
that the meaning of this doctrine varied among nations.
The dissipation of the major European political systems, from the tradi-
tional dichotomy of presidential and parliamentary, into various mixed
models has contributed to the difficulty of trying to classify constitutions.
In England, for instance, the evolution of the classic parliamentary model
resulted in the shift of power from the parliament to its intrinsic part, the
cabinet.18 The process resulted in the emergence of a parliamentary-cabi-
net system. In Germany, where the basic law makes the chancellor
responsible to the Bundestag, the strengthening of the chancellor's pre-
rogatives by several constitutional mechanisms resulted in the emergence
of a special constitutional model referred to as "chancellor's democ-
racy."' 9 France, although traditionally inclined toward a parliamentary
democracy, incorporated into its system a number of features typical of a
presidential model, the result being the creation of a hybrid parliamen-
tary-presidential system.2"
Hybrid systems of judicial review have also made clear-cut constitu-
tional classifications difficult. The two most identifiable systems of judi-
cial review, the so-called American and Austrian models, have become
less and less popular over time in their unadulterated forms.21 The
American model of decentralized or defused and concrete review allows
all courts the right to review the constitutionality of laws. Constitutional
issues may only arise, however, as incidental to other litigious issues.
Conversely, the power of review in the classic Austrian or centralized
model is vested either in a country's supreme court or in a special court.
Review under the Austrian model can be initiated through an independ-
ent action raising an abstract issue of constitutionality.22 The decentral-
ized model was adopted by several South American countries, such as
Argentina and Mexico, by former British colonies such as Australia and
India, by the Scandinavian states and by Japan and Greece. A modified
version of the Austrian model was incorporated into the Spanish (1931)
and Italian (1948) constitutions. In more recent years, countries with
17 Socialist constitutionalism was a glaring exception here. The socialist theories
maintained that power in their system was concentrated, but that its functions were
allocated to different government branches. See LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 201.
18 For a more exhaustive examination of the process of transition to Cabinet, see
E.C.S. WADE & A.W. BRADLEY, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
65 (11th ed. 1993).
19 ALEX. N. DRAGNICH & JORGEN RAsMUSSEN, MAJOR EUROPEAN
GovERNmENTs 397-403 (1982).
20 See id. at 274.
21 Justice Robert F. Utter & Justice Robert Nygaard, Commentary, Follow-Up
CEELI Technical Legal Assistance Workshop on the Draft Lithuanian Constitution,
CENT. & E. EUR. L. INrrATriv (ABA/CEELI Washington, D.C. 1992).
22 See MAURO CAPPELLETMI, JUDICLAL REVIEW IN THE CoNTEMPORARY WORLD
10 (1971).
1998]
6 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1
legal systems emerging from common law roots, such as New Guinea and
Uganda, have experimented with the effectiveness of the concentrated
system of review. Nevertheless, a careful commentator must observe that
the number of countries experimenting with mixed systems of judicial
review is growing. The German model, for instance, is a combination of
abstract and concrete review. Furthermore, the components of both the
concentrated and diffuse models can be found in Portugal, Venezuela,
Brazil, Guatemala, Columbia and Peru. Switzerland also has a mixture of
decentralized and concentrated systems.23
There is no need to multiply these examples. The above-made obser-
vations illustrate that the classification of the constitutions recently
adopted by the East-Central European states is not an easy task. Most of
the basic laws adopted after World War II cannot be described on the
basis of the traditional criteria; they are "mixed" or "hybrid" acts pro-
duced as the result of a sophisticated process of intermingling different
components of several well-known constitutional models.
Still, there are exceptions. The 1946 Constitution of Japan, drafted
under the guidance of United States experts, has an artificial American
flavor. Most of the postcolonial constitutions of Asia, Africa and the
Near East were simply copied from the constitutional structures of estab-
lished countries, without regard to the applicability of those devices to
the unique geopolitical circumstances in which the new states had
emerged. In addition, the prototype of a socialist constitution was framed
in Moscow and duplicated in all other countries of Soviet dominance.24
Thus, searching for a common core in the new postsocialist constitu-
tions is a meaningful comparative task. Currently, no single dominant
model has surfaced in East-Central Europe. This conclusion, however, is
neither an easily predictable nor obvious one. The countries of this
region faced similar problems, and similar constitutional remedies were
often tested to arrive at solutions. In comparing these constitutional
devices, it is useful to consider how some were selected and whether the
process of constitutional "mixing" blended them into a coherent body of
constitutional rules and maxims. By acknowledging that the term "blend-
ing," rather than the term "modeling," better characterizes the constitu-
tion-making process in the new postsocialist democracies, one can
observe how this modem technique of constitutional drafting really
works in practice. To crystallize the meaning of "blending" in the context
of the East-Central European constitutional laboratory, this Article
focuses on several main constitutional features and examines the fre-
quency with which they were used.
23 See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 263-
327 (1989).
1 For an examination of the common core of the socialist constitutions (Poland,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania) see LUDWIKOWSKI, supra
note 1, at 7-44.
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II. EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN CoNsTTUTIoNAL MELTING POT
A. Distribution of Powers of Government
The basic idea that the powers of government should be limited and its
functions diffused is currently implemented in several constitutional mod-
els. In the so-called French model, the principle of the division of powers
is similar to the principle of the separation of powers in that there exists
an actual separation of political organs and functions.25 The system of
checks and balances, traditionally associated with the American model,
places more emphasis on the equality of powers than on the separation of
functions. Conversely, in England, the powers of the various branches of
government have never been equal nor well separated. Rather, the func-
tions of the organs are blended, and the principal of division of powers
has come to mean only that the powers are not entirely concentrated in
one branch of the government. Similarly, in the countries of the new
democracies of East-Central Europe, the interpretation of the constitu-
tional principle of the division of powers is even more blurred, the rela-
tions between the powers more complicated, and the drafters less inclined
to adopt in pure form any one of the three models mentioned above.
Traditionally, socialist constitutionalism rejected the doctrine of the
division of powers, claiming that the entire power of governance should
be vested in the supreme representative bodies-the people's legisla-
tures.26 According to Marx, the doctrine of the separation of powers was
"in principle nothing else than a profane industrial division of labor
applied to state mechanism for the purpose of rationalization and con-
trol."27 Thus, the socialist theorists maintained that power in their system
was concentrated in the legislature but that its functions were allocated to
different government branches.2" In contrast to the concept of the divi-
sion of powers, the socialist system of government was referred to as a
model of "democratic centralism."29 In theory, the decision-making
25 See Ludwikowski, Constitution-Making in the Countries of Former Soviet
Dominance: Current Development, supra note 1, at 246-48. See also ARTHUR TAYLOR
VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CiviL LAW SYSTEM 217 (2nd ed.
1977).
26 See Chris Osakwe, The Common Law of Constitutions of the Communist-Party
States, 3 REv. SocIAisr L. 155, 174 (1977).
27 H. J. Uibopuu, Separation of Powers, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW (F.J.M.
Feldbrugge, et. al. eds. 2d rev. ed. 1985) See also Ludwikowski, Searching for a New
Constitutional Model for East-Central Europe, supra note 1, at 134-35.
28 See KONSTrrUTSIIA [Constitution] art. 3 (U.S.S.R.) (1985), [hereinafter U.S.S.R.
CONST. (1985)] reprinted in Lunwicowsmi, supra note 1, at 607.
29 The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. explains the concept of democratic centralism:
The Soviet state is organized and functions on the principle of democratic
centralism, namely the electiveness of all bodies of state authority from the
lowest to the highest, their accountability to the people, and the obligation of
lower bodies to observe the decision of higher ones.
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power was reserved for elective representatives of the people who
worked in response to initiatives of the masses.3" In actual practice, how-
ever, these representatives operated in accord with the recommendations
of the Communist Party, the leading and guiding force of socialist soci-
ety.3" The socialist jurisprudence claimed, however, that it disqualified
the doctrine of division of powers not for its noncompliance with the
monopoly power of the communist party, but rather because of its incon-
sistency with the idea of the superiority of parliaments.3 2
The reluctance by the former socialist states of East-Central Europe to
experiment with the idea of the divisions of powers was evident in the
early stages of their post-socialist constitutional works. The drafters of
the first post-socialist constitutions were either not sufficiently familiar
with the Western models of the division of powers doctrine or simply
believed that such doctrines could not encompass such diverse systems as
the British, French and American systems. 3 They associated the concept
of divided powers with the idea of equal distribution of state authority,
and seemed to believe that the doctrine was not applicable in political
systems which recognized the superiority of one power.34
This confusion seemed to stem initially from a lack of clear understand-
ing of the distinction between the concepts of the division of state func-
tions or governmental competencies and the division of powers.3 5 The
Id.
30 "Democratic centralism combines central leadership with local initiative and
creative activity and with the responsibility of each state body and official for the
work entrusted to them." Id.
1 See D. L. Ford, The Legal System of Albania, in 8 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS
CYCLOPEDIA 2d 25 (Kenneth Robert Redden rev. ed., 1991).
32 See T. SZYMCZAK, USTROJ EUROPEJSKICH PANSTW SOCJALISTYCZNYOH
[Political Systems of the European Socialist States] 427-31 (1983).
11 Professor Andrzej Pullo, a constitutional expert from Poland, wrote: "It is
amazing that different governmental forms, such as British, American or more
generally European, are all, in the same way, associated with this single organizational
principle." ANDRZEJ PULLO, DIVISION OF POWER IN DOCTRINE, LAW AND RECENT
CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTE IN POLAND 4 (1993) (delivered to the Conference of
Constitutional Law Institutes in Szczecin, Poland) (on file with author).
14 Andrzej Pullo wrote:
The division of power is commonly understood today as the concept which
rejects the idea of homogeneity or unity of power and in particular stands in
contrast to one component of this idea-superiority of one and single state's organ.
The most common contemporary understanding of the term 'division of power'
requires that the constitutional norms guarantee a relative equilibrium between
the leading organs of the state.
Id. at 2, 4.
35 "It is not difficult to find out that the term 'division of power' looks
exceptionally uncomplicated. Each of [the] two words which comprise the term is well
known in a colloquial language. Put together these words mean the division of
competencies." Id. at 3.
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former concept involves a system in which the decision-making power is
concentrated in a single organ, political organization or ruler, while the
mechanisms through which that power is executed are delegated to sev-
eral subordinate organs or institutions. This concept should be distin-
guished from the latter concept of dividing the decision-making power
itself among several different organs of government. While the scope of
power allocated to each organ may not be equal, the organs themselves
are not hierarchically organized in the sense that they are completely sub-
ject to the control of one superior organ. In the system of democratic
governance, these organs draw power from the people, the ultimate
source of sovereign authority; they can appeal to the people directly with-
out the affirmance of a supreme intermediate organ. The former concept
clearly stands in contrast to the idea of limited government, which is a
fundamental premise of the doctrine of division of powers; the latter con-
cept creates the general framework within which the doctrine of the divi-
sion of powers can function.
The distinction just drawn between these two concepts holds even in
the face of the classic parliamentary model, which has traditionally pro-
vided ammunition against the application of the concept of the division of
powers. In the parliamentary system, which provides that the cabinet sits
in the legislative body and is accountable to its majority, the executive has
a limited power to dissolve the legislature and appeal to the people for
final political directions. 6 This position provokes some logical reserva-
tions. The concept of the "balancing of powers," implies the existence of
"several powers" or several organs in which the power is vested. No
other conclusion seems to be logically acceptable. Thus the balance of
powers is a crucial test that qualifies the powers of the executive, rather
than merely an allocation of functions to this organ by the legislature
The initial confusion discussed above was furthered by the interchange-
able use of the terms "division of powers" and "separation of powers."
The first of these terms refers to any system of divided responsibilities;
the second, a narrower version of the first, requires apportioning deci-
sion-making power to separate branches of the government. Thus, the
decision-making power within a state may be divided yet the branches of
the government need not be kept separate, as in the parliamentary sys-
tem. Conversely, without mutually controlling each other, blended
branches of governments may cooperate or share some functions. In the
opinion of this author, in the parliamentary system, the executive and
36 In contrast to this position Pullo wrote:
Wherever, one makes additional exceptions from the principle of organizational
and personal separation of powers and where, without any limitations, the
institutions are created which make the powers mutually dependent, there we
cannot speak about the rule of the division ofpower. We may find there, at most,
the concept of balancing the powers, which, however, is rather different than
similar to the concept of the division of power.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
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legislative organs are blended, not separate. Neither organ, however, is
in control of the other, and in this sense power is divided between them.
The idea of "checks and balances" in fact conflicts with the principle of
pure separation of powers but not with the general concept of divided
power. Organs which interact with one another and which share certain
functions cannot be fully separated. Thus, while the division of authority
may imply interrelation of the recipients of power, the separation of
authority does not."
The East-Central European state's confusion concerning the meanings
and substance of the division of powers and the separation of powers
doctrines led their theorists38 to attempt to trace the origins of the divi-
sion of powers doctrine to the Aristotelian or Polybian concept of mixed
political systems. Such a system is characterized by the blending of ele-
ments of a monarchy, an aristocracy and a democracy, and distributing
governmental functions among several organs in order to contribute to
the social and political stability of the government's structures. The roots
of the modern division of powers doctrine, however, are not derived fully
from the Aristotelian concept. Rather, to the authors of the modern divi-
sion of powers doctrine, Locke and Montesquieu, the real rationale for
the distribution of power was not so much the intention to improve the
stability of the government through the distribution of its functions, it was
the fear of an absolute arbitrary authority. 39 Thus, the concept of a gov-
ernment whose authority is limited through its diffusion among several
organs is a fundamental component of the modern doctrine of division of
powers, and wherever this principle is constitutionally recognized we may
find some reception of the Lockean or Montesquean doctrine.
The drafters of the first postsocialist constitutions attempted to contest
the assumption that the elements of the division of powers doctrine could
be found in almost all political forms other than autocratic or totalitarian
systems.40 As a result, they either rejected the doctrine in its entirety or
attempted to incorporate it in a reduced form which would emphasize the
balance between the powers. For example, in the first constitutional
drafts, prepared by the Constitutional Commission of the Polish Seym,41
the drafters made no clear reference to this doctrine and provided only
17 See PETER 1. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWER: CASES
AND MATERIALS 3 (1996).
38 See PULLO, supra note 33, at 4-18.
31 John Locke wrote, "Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled
standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government
.... " JOHN LocKE., Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 186 (W.S. Carpenter ed.
J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1970).
40 Emphasizing this apparently erroneous approach Pullo wrote: "In result we are
seeking for the division of powers in any system of government but autocratic."
PULLO, supra note 33, at 14.
41 The Seym is a main legislative chamber of the Polish Parliament.
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that the nation was the source of power, and that this power was disposed
on the basis of the law and within its boundaries.4 2 The Seym was
referred to as an "organ representing the nation" and the government
(Rada Ministrow - Council of Ministers) as "an institution that conducts
[the] internal and foreign policy of the state and is in charge of [the]
state's administration."43 In contrast to the Seym draft, the draft consti-
tution of the Polish Senate stated that "the State's power is executed by
the separated and balanced legislative, executive and judicial organs."'
After several years of constitutional exercises in the countries of for-
mer Soviet dominance, the reluctance to accept the doctrine of division of
powers ("d.o.p.") seemed to abate. The following chart illustrates the
several basic trends or tendencies:
TABLE 1
references
clear to
references declaration legislature
to the of the executive, references references
supremacy d.o.p. in and to the to the
of the the basic judiciary separation balance of
parliament principles as powers of powers powers
Albania x
Belarus x x x
Bulgaria
Czech Republic x x
Estonia x x x x
Georgia x x x
Hungary x
Kazakhstan x x x x
Kyrgyzstan x x x
Lithuania x
Poland x
Rumania x
Russia x x x x
Slovakia x
Ukraine x x
As illustrated by the chart, none of the newly adopted postsocialist
constitutions clearly rejects the d.o.p. doctrine or declares its dedication
to the concept of concentration of power. The Constitution of Bulgaria,
42 See CONsTrrUTIoNAL DRAFrs, at 20 (Marian Kallas ed., 1992).
43 Id. at 42.
44 Id. at 44 (Senate Draft).
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for example, leaves no doubt as to the drafters' dedication to this
concept; the document declares that "the power of the state is divided
between a legislative, an executive, and a judicial branch."45 Poland's
Small or Interim Constitution clearly divides power between the Seym
and the Senate (organs of legislative power), the President and the
Council of Ministers (organs of executive power), and the independent
courts (organs of judicial power).46 Still, while other countries clearly
invoke the d.o.p. doctrine, there is no unambiguous reference to the
d.o.p. doctrine in the constitutions of Hungary or Slovakia.
Despite their clear declaration of the division of powers, several
constitutions still retain the traditional socialist language and do not refer
to executive and judicial organs as powers. The government is not
referred to as "a power" at all, but is rather the "the supreme and
administrative organ" or an organ of state administration, which ensures
the implementation of "the domestic and foreign policy."47 The judicial
organ is referred to as the "judicial authority."4 In addition, several
constitutions declare both their dedication to the d.o.p. doctrine and the
principle of the supremacy of the parliament.49 This signifies the
changing attitude of the postsocialist drafters who now, more so than in
the early stages of constitutional reform, are inclined to agree that these
two rules may be capable of forming a homogeneous mixture in the sense
that the divided powers might be unequal and not clearly separated. It
must be noted, however, that the principle of supremacy of the
parliament is recognized even in the countries which opt for a model of a
presidential republic (Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan), which clearly
signifies the tendency to give this principle a character of pure "window-
dressing."
Furthermore, several former Soviet republics frequently emphasize
that balance and equilibrium among the executive and legislative
authorities are highly valued attributes of good government.5" Within
this grouping of states, the American model of checks and balances
enjoys some popularity. Still, at least one constitution (Kazakhstan)
45 KONSTITTISnA [Constitution] art. 8 (Bulg.) [hereinafter BULG. CONST.].
46 See Constitutional Act, art. 1 (1992) (Pol.), reprinted in LUDWIKOWSKI, supra
note 1, at 510.
4 See, e.g., Interim Albanian Constitution (1991), arts. 15, 33 [hereinafter ALB.
CONST. (Interim 1991)], reprinted in LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 320, 324. The
Constitution of Kazakhstan still refers to the Supreme Soviet (legislature) as the
"highest representative body," and refers to the government as the body "authorized
to solve the questions of state management." KONSrTUTSIIA [Constitution] arts. 62,
84 (Kaz.) [hereinafter KAZ. CONST.], reprinted in LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 450,
454.
48 See CONSTIrtYrIA [Constitution] ch. VI (Rom.) [hereinafter RoM. CONST.],
reprinted in LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 547.
41 See TABLE 1, supra.
50 They are Belarus, Estonia and Kazakhstan. See TABLE 1, supra.
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maintains that the Parliament is "the highest representative body,"51
while at the same time providing that the d.o.p. doctrine is based on "the
concept of restraints and counterbalances."52 These declarations seem
contradictory of one another, as the system of checks and balances is
designed to limit a supreme influence or power of one constitutional
organ.
B. Legislatures: Bicameralism v. Unicameralism
Commenting on the classification of political systems, C. F. Strong
wrote that "a division of modem legislatures into those made up of one
house and those having two chambers is not very real because it would
put all the important states in one category, and all the less important
states, as for example, Finland and Turkey, in the other."53 Strong was
correct that classifying political systems on grounds of bicameralism or
unicameralism is not very effective for the simple reason 'that, in the
beginning of this century, most states seemed to believe that bicameral
legislatures were superior to unicameral legislatures.54
The rationale for having bicameral legislatures has historically been
fourfold. First, it has been argued that in the federal countries, such as
the United States, Germany, the Soviet Union and Switzerland, the upper
houses provide a natural representation of the interests of the separate
political entities of these states.55 Secondly, good reasons have existed
for setting up bicameral legislatures in states which promoted a policy of
regionalism, such as Belgium, Spain or Italy.55 Thirdly, bicameralism
seems to be well grounded in the concept of checks and balances where
one chamber is set up to balance the power of the other. Some experts
also believed that the upper chamber enhanced the stability of the polit-
ical system, providing the executive an important ally in surviving parlia-
mentary crises. 57 Fourthly, the upper chambers survived in the countries
51 KAz. CONST. art. 63
52 See KAz. CONST. pmbl.
53 C.F. STRONG, MODERN PoLMcAL CONSTITUTIONS 67 (1949).
54 Howard Lee McBain and Lindsay Rogers observed in 1922 that all the new
constitutions of Europe, with the exception of Finland, Estonia, and Yugoslavia,
provided for bicameral legislatures. See HowARD LEE MC BAIN & LINDsAY ROGERS,
THn Nnw CONsTrruTIONS OF EUROPE 38 (1922).
55 See GEORGE TSEBELIS & JEANETrE MONEY, BICAMERALISM 33-34 (1997).
56 It was often claimed that in unitary systems, the second chamber may represent
interests of minorities including regional interest groups. For a discussion of these
arguments see Lord Campion, Second Chambers in Theory and Practice, 7
PARLAMENTARY AFF. 17 (1953-54). For the application of these arguments in the
postsocialist constitutional doctrine, see L. GARLICKi & K. GOLYNsKI, PoLSKIE
PRAwA KONSTuCYJNE (Polish Constitutional Law) 115 (1996).
57 This rationale was quite visible in the intentions of the drafters of the
constitutions of the French Third and Fifth Republics. Alex N. Dragnich and Jorgen
Rasmussen wrote:
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with strong traditions of bicameralism, such as the United Kingdom. It
may thus be reasonably argued that one of these reasons could always be
sufficient to justify the existence of a bicameral system. As McBain and
Rogers concluded in 1922, "One of the most interesting features of the
new constitutions of Europe is found in the provisions relating to second
chambers. Most of the legislatures are bicameral. Only Finland, Estonia,
and Yugoslavia have been bold enough to dispense with the time-
honored check of an upper and usually less popular legislative body." 8
The position of socialist jurisprudence in the dispute over the rationale
for bicameralism was different. Only the first of the above mentioned
reasons seemed to appeal to the drafters of communist constitutions.
"Whereas the legislatures of all the unitary states have only one cham-
ber," wrote Chris Osakwe, "those of the federal states have at least two
chambers-the USSR Supreme Soviet has two chambers, the Yugoslav
Federal Assembly has six chambers, and the Czechoslovak National
Assembly has two chambers."5 9 Aside from these exceptions, the social-
ist lawyers believed that second chambers were either anti-democratic or
unnecessary, 60 caused delays in the legislative process and represented
elitist interests rather than quasi-independent groups.
The creation of the Polish Senate in 1989 was a response to the
demands of revolutionary times, and was expected to create a framework
for further pluralization of the political system.6 1 During the disputes of
Turning to the distribution of power between the two houses of Parliament in the
Fourth Republic the upper chamber was a weak body, quite in contrast to the
Senate of the Third Republic, known as the Council of the Republic. In returning
in the Fifth Republic to the old name for the upper house, an effort was made to
restore that chamber to much of its former power. This was a deliberate political
tactic. The Gaulists were uncertain of their ability to control the lower house, but
were confident that they would have an ally in the conservative upper house.
Therefore they sought to give it considerably more power than that possessed by
the Council of the Republic in the Fourth Republic. See DRAGNICH &
RASMUSSEN, supra note 19, at 263.
This was also the intention of the drafters of the German Basic Law of 1949. The
German emergency legislative procedure gives the chancellor the possibility to over-
come a legislative deadlock and rule for six months with the assistance of the
Bundesrat (the upper house) if the chancellor resolves not to call the new elections.
See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 81 (F.R.G.) (1993) [hereinafter [GG]),
reprinted in DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY, 376-77 (1994).
58 MCBAIN & ROGERS, supra note 54, at 38.
59 Osakwe, supra note 26, at 177.
60 See KONSTANTY GRzyBowsiKI, SENAT ALBO NIEDEMOKRATYCZNY ALBO
NiEPOTRZEBNY (1946) (Senate Either Anti-Democratic or Unnecessary). See also
Jarosz, Problem drugiej izby parlamentu: Zarys Koncepcji (Problem With the Second
Chamber of Parliament: Outline of the Concept), 44 PANSTWO I PRAWO (State and
Law) 16-28 (Jan. 1989).
61 See Wojciech Sokolewicz, Kwietniowa Zmiana Konstytucji (April Constitutional
Changes), 6 PANSTWO I PRAwo 3-19 (June 1989).
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"the round table," the second chamber was sometimes perceived as the
equivalent of "the chamber of labor," and was expected to represent
trade unions or self-governmental institutions as in the Yugoslavian sys-
tem. 62 This perception was offered as a rational for establishing a second
chamber, but when discussed was apparently not convincing enough. In
pluralistic societies the interests of particular social factions are usually
represented successfully by pressure groups or lobbies, and singling out
several institutions or unions as authorized to be represented in the sec-
ond chamber usually appears arbitrary. For this reason, some Polish
commentators argued for a more democratic electoral system in which
one senator would be elected by one million electors, rather than by
either the artificially created 100 electoral districts or upon the basis of
the system in which each voivodship (administrative district) would be
represented by two senators.63 Others argued that a weaker position of
the Senate, in comparison to the Seym, undermined the purpose of the
Senate.64
A review of the drafting processes in other post-communist democra-
cies fails to reveal any clear pattern in the selection of either bicameral or
unicameral systems. It appears quite reasonable that a federal country,
such as Russia, would set up a bicameral legislature and that most of the
unitary states of the former Soviet Union, such as Azerbaijan, Estonia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Lithuania, and some former Soviet European
satellites, such as Bulgaria, Hungary or Slovakia would favor unicameral
legislatures.
For other new democracies, however, a clear rationale for favoring
bicameralism was absent. The Ukraine portrayed itself as a state promot-
ing regionalism, and the country's first draft constitutions provided for a
two-chamber legislative body.65 In response, however, to intense internal
discussions and after consultations with foreign experts, the drafters of
62 See GARLIcKI & GOLYNSKi, supra note 56, at 116-17.
63 The last mentioned system finally prevailed in Poland.
64 As Garlicki and Golynski claim, the Polish Senate does not represent
administrative districts or local interests and because of this its existence is not clearly
supported by rational arguments. Also, as a component of the system of checks and
balances, the Senate is not very effective. See GARLICl & GoLYNsKi, supra note 56,
at 117-18.
65 The Ukrainian draft of June 1992 stated that the territory of the state is "one,
indivisible, inviolable and whole (art. 7)," but confirmed the status of Crimea as an
autonomous republic and the right to a strong self-government of other regions.
Article 128 referred to the Ukrainian upper chamber (The Council of Delegates) as
"a territorially representative body." See Constitutional Committee of the Ukraine,
Draft Submitted to the Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) of the
American Bar Association, June 10, 1992 (on file with author).
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the Ukrainian Constitution of June 28, 1996 decided to set up a unicam-
eral parliament (the People's Rada of Ukraine).66
In Kyrgyzstan, the consideration of a bicameral legislature was moti-
vated by reference to the concept of checks and balances.67 Ultimately,
however, the upper chamber was perceived as a political puppet and as
an artificially created presidential ally, and the drafters of the Constitu-
tion of May 5, 1993 finally decided to establish a single legislative cham-
ber-the Jogorku Kenesh.6 s
The situation in Belarus took a different turn. The Constitution,
adopted by the referendum of November 7, 1996, established a bicameral
legislature.69 The drafters reserved for the President a prerogative to
appoint one-third of the senators, a clear revelation of the President's
intention to create a "puppet" chamber controlled by him.7" The Consti-
tution allows the President to dissolve the Chamber of Representatives
but simultaneously states that he "may also" terminate the powers of the
Senate. This arrangement leads to concerns that the President may try to
dissolve the legislative chamber and attempt to legislate himself through
a "puppet" higher chamber. In addition, the President's state of emer-
gency powers are dependent solely upon approval by the Senate,7'
another indication that the Senate is in reality an instrument of the Presi-
dent's power.
The Czech Republic decided to maintain a bicameral parliament, even
after the disintegration of the federal Czechoslovakia. The creation of
the Senate, however, has remained at the center of constitutional contro-
versies. 7' Although proposals to amend the Constitution to eliminate
bicameralism have been repeatedly rejected by the Chamber of Depu-
66 See KoNswrrtrrsuA [Constitution], art. 72 (Ukr.) (1992) (hereinafter UKR.
CONST. (1992)) reprinted in LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 352. See also, Comments
on the Draft Constitution for the Ukraine, CENT. & E. EUR. L. INITIATIVE, (ABA/
CEELI Washington D.C., May 1996).
67 The draft Constitution of June 16, 1992 provided for one chamber, the Mejilis,
but the outline of the new Constitution drafted by Trar Koichuyev mentioned two
chambers, the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate.
68 See KONSTrrUTSIIA [Constitution] ch. IV (Kyrg.) (hereinafter KYRG. CONST.
reprinted in LUDWIKOWSK, supra note 1, at 474.).
69 See Belarus: Lukashenko-Opposition Conflict Heats Up, CURRENT DiO. PosT-
SoviET PREss, Sept. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
70 For a critique of the Belarusan bicameralism, see Analysis of the Draft
Constitution of the Republic of Belarus with Alterations and Amendments, CENT. & E.
EUR. L. INrrIATIVE 16-18 (ABA/CEELI Washington, D.C., October 15, 1996).
71 KONSTrrUTSUA [Constitution] art. 100(18) (Belr.) [hereinafter BELR. CONST.]
reprinted in LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 344.
72 See Most Czechs Thinks Senate Unnecessary: Poll, CTK NAT'L NEWS WIRE
(Czech.), Sept. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CTK File.
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ties,73 the Senate was not elected until November 1996, and many of its
functions had been performed by the lower chamber.
Romania also established an upper house, despite the numerous reser-
vations of Western constitutional experts, who could hardly find a ration-
ale for a Senate in a unitary state which did not clearly recognize the
principle of division of powers.74 When considering all of the East Cen-
tral European states as a whole, however, unicameralism prevails in the
new post-communist democracies, and it remains to be seen how effective
those few bicameral parliaments established in this region will be.
TABLE 2
unicameral parliament bicameral parliament
Albania X
Belarus X
Bulgaria X
Czech Republic X
Estonia X
Georgia X
Hungary X
Kazakhstan X
Kyrgzstan X
Lithuania X
Poland X
Rumania X
Russia X
Slovakia X
Ukraine X
C. Electoral Systems
The democratic electoral systems of the socialist countries broke down
as a result of a combination of the following major elements: defective
nomination processes, defective secrecy mechanisms, and a lack of ade-
quate and reliable public control of election results.75
In the Soviet Union, the nomination phase, one of the most sensitive
and important elements of the democratic electoral process, was seriously
73 See Parliament Rejects Proposal To Delete Senate from Constitution, CIK NAT'L
NEWS Wipm, Oct. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CIK File; Less than a
Half of Czechs not Sure About Senate: Poll, CIK NAT'L NEws WiRE, Sept. 24, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CITK File.
74 See arguments raised during the CEELI workshops in Washington D.C. on the
Draft Constitution of Romania in Spring 1991 (on file with author).
75 See Ludwikowski, Searching for the New Constitutional Model for East-Central
Europe, supra note 1, at 139.
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affected by a system which granted the right to nominate candidates to
branches and organizations of the Communist Party (the "CPSU"), trade
unions, the Young Communist League, co-operatives, and other public
organizations, work collectives, and meetings of servicemen.76
The actual casting of ballots was another element that affected the
democratic character of the socialist election process. The voter, before
obtaining a ballot paper, had to identify himself and check his or her
name on the list of voters. The Party propaganda claimed that the voter
could cast a valid ballot simply by dropping it in the ballot box. This
procedure was recognized as evidencing trust for the Party candidates
who were located at the beginning of the list. Thus, even if the list had
more candidates than seats allocated to this electoral district, the first
candidates on the list would be deemed voted on. The voting booths
were usually located at the distant parts of the electoral rooms. To vote
secretly, the voter had to parade by the whole room in full view of the
Party representatives present.77
This lack of trust in the elective practice -electoral rolls and proce-
dure for their compilation, counting electoral votes in the electoral
wards- created an atmosphere of futility and hopelessness that dis-
suaded attempts to vote secretly. In addition, the Party's backstage prop-
aganda discretely persuaded the voter to remember that the electoral
behavior of the members of society would be carefully observed by the
Party, and would affect the assessment of individual contributions to the
social well-being, a basic factor in the process of the distribution of social
goods.78
Thus, prior to the fall of communism, in most of the countries of the
Soviet bloc, only one person ran for each seat in an uncontested election
with a high electoral participation.79 The multi-seat districts were tested
in other socialist countries.80 They were introduced in Poland where usu-
ally between four and six representatives were elected in one district, and
in the German Democratic Republic where four to ten representatives
might be elected from a single list.8 ' The 1983 reform of the Hungarian
electoral laws also introduced the system of double or multiple nomina-
76 See U.S.S.R. CONST. (1985) art. 100.
77 See LEONARD SCHAPIRO, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION 458
(1971).
78 The comments above on the socialist electoral practices were taken from Rett R.
Ludwikoski, Soviet Constitutional Changes of the Glasnost Era: A Historical
Perspective, 10 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 119, 144 (1989).
79 See ANDREI Y. VYSHINSKY, THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE 711 (1948);
Ludwikowski, Searching for the New Constitutional Model for East-Central Europe
supra note 1, at 142-43.
80 See Ludwikowski, Searching for the New Constitutional Model for East-Central
Europe, supra note 1, at 138-39.
81 See id.
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tions, simultaneously confirming the primacy of individual districts.
82
Furthermore, the multi-seat system or system of multiple nominations,
also introduced by Gorbachev's Law on Constitutional Amendments, 3
did not democratize the electoral law of socialist countries ipso facto.
One of the fundamental changes brought about by the fall of the Soviet
empire was an incorporation of the principle of political pluralism into
the basic constitutional structures of the new democracies. Since the
emergence of the Polish Solidarity, it was clear that one of the discernible
trends in the new constitutions would be the attempt to recognize a multi-
party system as an element of a well-functioning constitutional govern-
ment. The adoption of an electoral model that would be able to accom-
modate this trend was the next challenge.
As D.W. Rae correctly pointed out, "present knowledge about the
politics of electoral law is neither very general in scope, nor entirely relia-
ble in content." 4 The knowledge of the constitutional drafters from the
new democracies about the systems of representation which were opera-
tive in the world at large certainly did not surpass the average. Their first
task was to review the panorama of electoral systems used in Europe.
For readers used to operating within the first-past-the-post-system,
("FPP") a more detailed examination of the choices faced by the East-
Central European constitutional experts is instructive.
The plurality system, traditionally used in the United Kingdom and the
United States and the countries of the British Commonwealth, such as
Canada and New Zealand 5 was the electoral system which the East-Cen-
tral European drafters were relatively most familiar with. In this sys-
tem-also referred to as the first-past-the-post-system -each
constituency returns only one representative.86 The voter indicates his
preference for one candidate and the candidate with the highest number
of votes wins, regardless of whether he received a majority of votes cast.
Although, in most instances, the system brings about majoritarian results,
it is not difficult to see that this winner-takes-all system also creates the
82 See Marta DezsS, Socialist Electoral Systems and the 1983 Hungarian Reform, in
YEARBOOK ON SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEMS 1986, at 37,45-47 (W.E. Butler ed., 1986).
83 See Constitutional Amendments Approved, FBis-Sov., Dec. 1, 1988, at 46-47.
84 DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS 5
(1967) See also Roland Bieber, Conditions and Consequences of a Uniform Electoral
Procedure for the European Parliament, in THE EUROPEAN PARLLAMENT: TOWARDS
A UNIFoRm PROCEDURE FOR DiRECr ELECTIONS 21 (1981) [hereinafter THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT].
85 See Richard Rose, Electoral Systems: A Question of Degree or of Principle?, in
CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 73-74 (AREND
LuPHART & BERNARD GROFMAN, Gerald M. Pomper ed., 1984).
86 See A. Antoszewski & R. Albertski, Systemy Wyborcze (Electoral Systems), in
DEMOKRACJE ZACHODNIOBUROPEiSKIE. ANALIZA POROWNAWCZA (Democracies of
Western Europe. Comparative Analysis) 230-31 (Andrezej Antoszewski & Ryszard
Herburt eds., 1997).
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possibility that, with several strong candidates, a majority will be gov-
erned by a mere plurality.
The plurality system can also be used in multi-seat constituencies in
which the voters have as many votes as there are seats in the constitu-
ency. The seats, are distributed among the candidates who receive the
largest number of votes.8 7 A modification of this system is the cumulative
voting (CV) system, under which each voter has as many votes as there
are seats available in his district but the votes may be cumulated on one
candidate or distributed among different candidates or even different par-
ties. This system is used in Luxembourg which has four constituencies,
each ranging from six to twenty-four seats, and gives the voters as many
votes as there are empty seats.88 The CV was also adopted for the lower
house of the Illinois legislature in 1870, but was abolished by referendum
in 1980. The limited use of the system made its evaluation difficult and its
adoption by the new European democracies very unlikely.
In order to avoid the result where a winning party obtains more than
fifty percent of parliamentary seats without receiving fifty percent of the
votes, the double-ballot majority system was developed. This system,
exemplified by France, was also well-known to the constitutional drafters
of the East-Central European countries at the time of drafting. While a
majoritarian result almost always results from a two party system such as
that of the United Kingdom and of the United States, a majoritarian
result-giving one candidate more than fifty percent of the votes-is
highly unlikely in France, given the number of relatively strong parties.8 9
Thus, France devised a system which provides that, where no candidate
obtains an absolute majority, a second ballot takes place.90 No one who
was not a candidate in the first round may run in the second, and the
threshold of representation for the second stage of elections is twelve and
half percent of the total electorate.9' If none of the candidates receives
this amount of the votes in the first round, two top candidates go to the
second round.92 If no candidate in the second round wins an absolute
majority, the round is conducted as a FPP election. 93
The alteration of the majoritarian model is referred to as an alternative
vote system. This system attempts to reach majoritarian results without
87 The system is used in Poland in the Senate election. Each voivodship (electoral
and administrative district) elects two senators with the exception of the Warsaw and
Katowice voivodships which elect three senators and accordingly each voter has
either two or three votes. The system is used also in Turkey. See id. at 231.
88 See D.A. Brew, Characteristics of Major Voting System and the National Voting
Systems of the Nine, in THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 84, at 31, 63.89 See DRAGNICH & RASMUSSEN, supra note 19, at 249.
9 See id. at 246-50.
91 See id. at 247.
92 See Antoszewski & Albertski, supra note 86, at 232.
93 See D.A. Brew, supra note 88, at 60.
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using run-off ballots. The voter has only one vote but gives his prefer-
ences as to his "second choice" candidates.94 If none of the candidate
receives an absolute majority, the votes of the candidate with the least
amount of votes are distributed among other candidates accordingly to
"second preferences" of the voters.95 This exercise repeats itself with
other candidates from the bottom of the list until one of the remaining
competitors receives at least fifty percent plus one votes.96
With the exception of the United Kingdom and France, all other West-
ern European states were using some form of proportional representation
(PR) at the time the East-European states were drafting their constitu-
tions. Generally speaking, the PR system is an electoral system charac-
terized by the allocation of seats to parties in proportion to the number of
votes cast for each party during an election. 97 This system has been
designed to underline the value of majority rule and provide minority
parties with representation proportional to their strength.98 In order to
prevent an excessive fractionalization of the parliaments, most of the PR
systems use a minimal threshold of representation, which means that
there is established a minimal percentage of votes needed to secure a
party's representation. 99 The votes collected by the parties which do not
meet this threshold requirement are distributed among the parties which
secured parliamentary representation for themselves."' The introduc-
tion of the minimal threshold requirement means only that the parties
which did not receive this required percentage of the votes (for example,
four percent, five percent, or more) will not return any representatives to
the parliament. Meeting the threshold requirement, however, still does
not guarantee that the party receives seats. The actual result still depends
on many factors, first of all being the given electoral support and the
model of seat distribution the country's electoral system uses. In other
words, satisfying the minimal threshold requirement represents a so-
called "grey area," where the party may or may not receive a seat. 01 In
94 See Antoszewski & Albertski, supra note 86, at 232.
95 See id.
96 See D. URWIN, THE ELECrORAL SYSTEMS 15 (1977). The system is used in
Australia. See DEMoKRAcm ZACHODNIOEUROPEJSKIE, supra note 86, at 232-33.
97 See Antoszewski & Albertski, supra note 86, at 230-39.
98 For an examination of the pros and cons of adopting proportional
representation in the United States, see generally Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R.
(Change Through Proportional Representation): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral
System, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1991 (1993); John R. Low-Beer, Note, The Constitutional
Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J., 165 (1984).
99 See Douglas Rae et al., Thresholds of Representation and Thresholds of
Exclusion: An Analytic Note on Electoral Systems, 3 COWv'. POL. STUD. 479, 479-88
(1971).
100 See id.
101 See D. A. Brew, supra note 88, at 47.
1998]
22 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1
given circumstances, it is, however possible to find a maximal threshold of
exclusion, beyond which the party is guaranteed their representation. 10 2
Among many systems of proportional representation, a list PR system
is most often used. In this system, each party presents a list of represent-
atives and an individual voter is allowed to cast one vote for the party of
his preference. °3 The seats are allocated to the parties proportionally to
the number of votes received. For example, if the party receives one seat,
the party's representative on the top of the list receives this seat; if the
party receives two seats, the two party representatives on the top of the
list are elected. Near the end of the 1980s, when the new European
democracies were designing their electoral systems, plurality and list pro-
portional systems were used in most of the democratic national legislative
elections of lower houses or unicameral legislatures. 10 4 There were a few
exceptions, such as France, Japan, Ireland, Malta and Australia (the
upper house).10 5
Ireland, Malta and Australia use the single transferable vote (STV) sys-
tem. This system is often considered as an alternative to the plurality and
party list PR systems which are often criticized for giving party leaders
excessive control over the party candidates. 106 After all, it is the party
leaders who decide who represents the party in the elections of each sin-
gle seat constituency in plurality systems and it is the party leaders who
arrange the party lists in accordance with their preferences in a list PR
systems. 0 7 The STV system was designed to distribute the seats in a way
which approximates the corresponding distribution of votes. The STV
system allows the voter to number candidates or parties in order of pref-
erence, and in this way affect the policy of the party. 10 8 Each voter still
has only a single vote, but this system prevents votes from being wasted
on candidates who do not need them, or from being allocated against the
voter's preferences where the votes are cast on a party which did not
reach the minimal threshold requirement. On the ballot, the voter
expresses his ch.oices, and if the first selected candidate does not require
102 It happens also that, if the number of the parties drops below the number of
seats to be allocated, the maximal threshold may be reduced and a so-called
intermediate maximal threshold is introduced.
103 See URWIN, supra note 96, at 20.
104 Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman concluded that plurality and list
proportional representation systems accounted for "17 of the 21 democracies that
have been continuously democratic since approximately the end of the Second World
War." Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman, Choosing an Electoral System, in
CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 85, at 3,
4.
105 See id.
106 See Brew, supra note 88, at 59.
107 See id.
108 See id. at 61-62. See also M. GALLAGHER ET AL., REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT IN 'WESTERN EUROPE 161 (1992).
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the vote, either because he cannot be elected or because he has already
secured enough votes, the vote is transferred to the voter's second or
third choices, and so forth.1" 9 This system operates in several rounds. It
fixes a "quota" of votes sufficient for an election.1 In the first round,
the candidates who receive the necessary quota of votes are recognized as
elected, in the second round surplus votes are distributed among the vot-
ers' alternative choices, which alters the total number of candidates who
secure the necessary quota of votes.11' In the third round, the candidate
from the bottom of the list is declared defeated and his votes are trans-
ferred to the candidates above him, again in accordance with the voters'
preferences. This procedure repeats itself with the next candidates with
the lowest amount of votes until all remaining candidates have quotas.112
The system which especially attracted the attention of the drafters from
the new democracies was the additional member system adopted by Ger-
many. "The name (of the system)," wrote W.P. Irine, "derives from the
fact that the system uses additional members to compensate for the dis-
tortions inevitably deriving from a system of single-member constituen-
cies." 113 In Germany, half of the members of the Bundestag are elected
via the simple plurality system. As in the United States and the United
Kingdom, the country is divided into a number of a single-seat constitu-
encies which is the equivalent of half of the membership of the
Bundestag, and each constituency elects one representative. The other
half of the deputies of the Bundestag are elected from the party lists.
Thus, each German voter votes twice, once for individual candidates in
the local districts and once for the state party lists. The seats allocated to
the parties are calculated on the basis of the second vote. There is a
threshold requirement of five percent, which means that the parties which
did not obtain this percent in the party vote (or did not get at least three
members in the first round) will not get any parliamentary representa-
tion.114 The seats received by the party members in the individual con-
stituencies are kept by the party. These seats are then supplemented
from the party's state lists accordingly to rank position on the list until the
109 For more details on the STV system, see George H. Hallet Jr., Proportional
Representation with the Single Transferable Vote: A Basic Requirement for Legislative
Elections, in CHOOSING AN ELECrORAL SYsTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra
note 85, at 113, 117-19.
110 See Brew, supra note 88, at 61.
111 See Hallet, supra note 109, at 117-18.
112 See id.
113 William P. Irvine, "Additional Member" Electoral Systems, in CHOOSING AN
ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 85, at 165, 167.
114 See U.W. Kitzinger, The West German Electoral Law, 11 PARLIAMENTARY
AFF. 220, 220-21 (1957-1958).
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entire number of seats allocated to the party in the second round is
exhausted.115
A less widely known and rarely used electoral system for national elec-
tions at the time of the drafting of the new constitutions was the limited
vote system and its subtype the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) sys-
tem.:1 6 In the former system the voter has several votes to cast but still
fewer than the number of the seats in the constituency." 7 The limited
vote is used to elect most of the Spanish senators, with the remaining
amount elected via the plurality system. Most of the constituencies are
four-member districts in which the voters have three votes to cast. In
smaller three-member districts they have only two votes." 8 The SNTV
system is used in the elections for the Japanese House of Representatives.
This system is a deviation of the American plurality system which uses
single-member districts. The Japanese SNTV system uses three to five-
seat constituencies; the voters residing therein have only one vote but
may cast it on individual candidates instead of party lists." 9 Both the
limited vote and the SNTV systems are regarded as a combination of the
plurality and RP systems. These systems have the advantage of the plu-
rality system's simplicity but use multi-seat districts. In the opinion of
most commentators both systems secure better minority repre-
sentation.' 20
In the early stages of democratic transformation, for the states being in
avant-garde of the changes, such as Poland or Hungary, proportional and
plurality/majority systems seemed to be the primary alternatives. The
literature on major voting models always concentrated on the pros and
cons of these two systems, and thus they naturally had to be considered
for adoption by the new democracies.' 2 '
Poland traditionally favored the system of plurality/majority which
appeared to guarantee a greater governmental stability. The Electoral
Law of April 7, 1989122 introduced two rounds of elections. The first
round required more than fifty percent of the votes for victory, while in
the second round a plurality sufficed. 23 This system was successful dur-
115 See Max Kaase, Personalized Proportional Representation: The "Model" of the
West German Electoral System, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 85, at 155, 157.
116 See Arend Lijphart, Trying to Have the Best of Both Worlds: Semi-Proportional
and Mixed Systems, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 85, at 207, 208.
117 See Antoszewski & Albertski, supra note 86, at 233.
I' See Lijphart, supra note 116, at 209.
119 See id. at 207-13.
120 See id. at 213.
121 See J.W. HOLUBIEC & J.W. MERCIK, TECHNIKI I TAJNIKI GLOSOWANIA
(Techniques and Secrets of Voting) (1992).
122 Dziennik Ustaw (Official Gazette), Apr. 8, 1989, Nr. 19.f.
123 See id.
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ing the transitory period when only two political blocs-Solidarity and
the governmental coalition-competed for power.' 24 In 1990, the Hun-
garians also discussed the benefits of the plurality system,125 and after
the fall of the Soviet Union the first-past-the-post-system apparently
appealed to the leaders of larger republics of this region, such as Russia,
Ukraine and Belarus.
With the further pluralization of political life, the constitutional draft-
ers from East-Central Europe were less and less inclined to consider plu-
rality (FPP) as the main alternative in choosing an electoral system.' 26
They realized that the FPP model was traditionally favored by the coun-
tries with a two-party system, while the proportionality system prevailed
in the multiparty democracies. Furthermore, critics of the FPP argued
that the degree of representativeness was usually lower in the countries
using the FPP than in the countries using PR systems, connoting that it
was very likely that the party's share of votes was not equivalent to its
share of seats. 27
During the 1990s, the focus of the debate on election methods shifted
from the dichotomy between the PR and plurality/majority systems to the
question of whether it was possible to find a mixed model that would
combine the best features of these two systems - stability and represen-
tativeness. Germany's additional member system was at the center of
attention. Stephen Holmes wrote,
many European states have now adopted mixed electoral systems...
combining PR with 'majoritarianism' through a variety of tech-
niques. A perhaps imperfect understanding of German electoral law
may have played a role in this choice. But equally important has
been the widespread perception that each system has important
advantages over its rival.' 28
As early as 1990, Hungary opted for a mixed system. In the elections
held in March and April of that year, twenty-eight parties contested for
124 For comments on the 1989 elections in Poland, see Ludwikowski, Searching for
a New Constitutional Model for East-Central Europe, supra note 1, at 156-57.
125 See Blaine Harden, Centrist Parties Surge in Hungarian Voting, WASH. POST,
Mar. 27, 1990, at A14.
126 See L. Garlicki & K. Golynski, Sasady Prawa Wyborcezego (Principles of
Electoral Law), in PoLSKiE PRAvA KONSTYTTCYJNE, supra note 56, at 82-92.
127 In fact, this traditional argument against plurality was recently undermined by
Richard Rose who claimed that "the most representative plurality system, the United
States House of Representatives, is at least as proportional as seven of the seventeen
PR systems." Richard Rose, supra note 85, at 74. For arguments critical of the
plurality system, see generally R.J. Johnston, Seats Votes, Redistricting and the
Allocation of Power in Electoral Systems, in CHOOSING AN ELEcrORAL SYSTEM supra
note 85, at 59-69.
128 Stephen Holmes, Designing Electoral Regimes, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Spring
1994, at 39, 40.
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386 seats of the Hungarian Parliament.'2 9 This mixed system was based
on three tiers. One hundred and seventy-six members were elected on a
in single-member constituencies on the basis of the FFP' system; one hun-
dred and fifty two seats were filled in multi-member districts according to
a list PR system; and fifty eight deputies were elected from a national list
based on transferable votes from the county lists.'
3 0
In Bulgaria, the electoral law was changing. The elections of 1990 were
held pursuant to a mixed (majority and proportional representation) sys-
tem; the system was replaced by proportional representation in October
1991, but over the years a number of parties began to consider the rein-
troduction of elements of the majority system, which in their opinion
would give the electorate a clear view as to whom they should elect.' 3 '
After the velvet divorce of the Czechs and Slovaks in 1993, the parlia-
ments of both countries introduced PR systems, which immediately faced
strong criticism from the proponents of a mixed proportional and major-
ity system led by Czech President Vaclav Havel and Slovak Premier Vlad-
imir Meciar. 132 Mixed systems were also introduced in Russia, Lithuania,
Azerbaijan and Georgia. 33 The following table exemplifies the choice of
electoral models.'
34
129 See Patrick Worsnip, Election Guide to Eastern Europe, REUTER NEWS
SERVICE-CIS AND EASTERN EUROPE, REUTER TEXTLINE, Mar. 15, 1990, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Txprim File.
130 See id.
L' See Bulgaria: Some No Confidence Vote: In Bnef, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, EE/1696/B, May 24, 1993 available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File.
132 See Simon Pellar, 40 Parties in Czechoslovak Elections, REUTERS TEXTLINE,
Apr. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txprim File. See also Havel's Sunday
Interview-Electoral Systems; Russia and NATO, REUTERS TEXTLINE, Nov 30, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Txprim File; Slovak National Party Against
Premier's Proposed Majority Electoral System, REUTERS TEXTLINE, Jan 11, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Txprim File.
133 See Duma Approves Law on Parliamentary Elections on First reading, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, SU/2162/B, Nov. 25, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, BBC File; President Brazauskas Proposes Amendments to Electoral
Law, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, EE/D2667/E, July 18, 1996, available
in LEXIS, News Library, BBC File; Lithuania's Landsbergis Takes Early Election
Lead, REUTERS TEXLINE, October 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txprim File; Azeri President Proposes New-look Parliament, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, SU/2368/F, July 29, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BBC File; Azerbaijan: Parliament Adopts Law on Parliamentary Elections, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, EE/D2381/F, Aug. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, BBC File; Crimea: Parliament Makes Progress in Discussion of Draft
Constitution, REUTERS TEXTLINE, Aug. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txprim File.
134 Most of the data provided in TABLE 3 was taken from the Table of TWelve
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TABLE 3
Mixed PR/ Mixed PR!
majoritarian plurality plurality /
PR system system system majority
Albania X
Belarus X
Bulgaria X
Czech Republic X
Estonia X
Georgia X
Hungary X
Lithuania X
Poland X
Rumania X
Russia X
Slovakia X
Ukraine X
With more and more countries of the region favoring one of the models
of proportional representation, the focus of the debate shifted to two
questions: what was an appropriate threshold for eligibility to hold
legislative seats, and what was the best method of distributing seats
among the parties which met the threshold requirements.
The confusing assumption that the introduction of a minimal threshold
of representation impairs the democratic character of the electoral
system and results in the waste of electoral votes proved a costly lesson
for some of the new democracies. The first democratic elections in
Poland in 1991 fragmented the Polish Seym, essentially paralyzing its
legislative work for two years. Using the system of strict proportionality,
and disregarding the threshold that kept weaker parties out, Poles elected
representatives of no fewer than twenty-nine parties to the Parliament;
no single party received more than thirteen percent of the vote.135 In
1993, the Seym introduced a five percent threshold for single parties and
an eight percent for coalitions.136 This course of action resulted in the
reduction of electoral groupings to eight and also provoked President's
Electoral Laws prepared by Christian Lucky. See Christian Lucky, Comparative
Chart of Electoral Regimes, E. EUR. CONST. Rv., Spring 1994, at 65-77.
135 As Bronislaw Geremek, a Polish historian and an early leader of Solidarity,
stated: "Different political parties formed and Poland even earned the right to be
entered into the Guiness Book of World Records. We had 250 political parties."
Bronislaw Geremek, Parliamentarism in Central Europe, E. EuR. CONST. REv.,
Summer 1995, at 43, 46.
136 See Garlicki & Golynski, supra note 126, at 84-89.
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Walesa's statement that he represented the thirty percent of citizens
whose votes were "thrown away" because of the thresholds. 13 7 Most of
the new democracies learned from this lesson and introduced a four or
five percent threshold for single parties and a wider threshold ranging
from seven to eleven percent for coalitions. 13
Searching for appropriate methods of seat distributions proved a more
difficult challenge; legislative electoral formulas are complicated, and
very few constitutional experts truly understand how they effect electoral
results. Three popular formulas were most often considered by the
drafters for adoption: d'Hondt system, Hare formula and Droop system.
The highest average d'Hondt system uses a system of successive divisors
(1, 2, 3). Each party's total vote is divided by the number of seats it
already receives plus 1; the party with the highest average is allocated a
seat until all remaining seats are distributed. 39 The counting goes
through as many rounds as there are seats for allocation. Let's assume
that in a hypothetical case four seats must be allocated to five competing
parties. The votes received by the parties are as follows:
TABLE 4
Divisor 1 Divisor 2 Divisor 3
Party A ...... 60 000 (seat) 30 000 (seat) 20 000
Party B ...... 40 000 (seat) 20 000 13 333
Party C ...... 26 000 (seat) 13 000 9 666
Party D ...... 24000 12000 8000
Party E ...... 10000 5000 3333
During the initial round of counting, no party has any seats, so the votes
cast on each party are divided by one. Party A has the highest average
and is given one seat. Now Party A's votes must be divided by 2 (1 +1),
which leaves the party with 30,000 votes, the result of which places this
party between party B and C. In this round Party B, which now has the
highest average, is given a seat. The number of votes of Party B are then
divided by 2 (1+1) and drop to 20,000; this places Party B just above Party
E. In the next round, Party A, with the highest average of 30,000 votes, is
337 See Holmes, supra note 128, at 40. See also Constitution Watch, E. EUR. CONST.
REV., Fall 1993, at 2, 14.
138 See Lucky, supra note 134, at 65-77.
139 See MARK P. JONES, ELECTORAL LAWS AND THE SURVIVAL OF PRESIDENTIAL
DEMOCRACIES 122 (1995). See also J.W. HOLUBIEC & J.W. MERCIK TECHNIKI I
TAJNIKI GLOSOWA'41A (Techniques and Secrets of Voting) 79-98 (1992). It is often
claimed that the distribution of seats according to the d'Hondt method in larger
electoral districts gives the results more adequate to actual support for the Parties. See
W. SOKOL, SPOLECZENSTWO, PANSTWO, WLADZA (Society, State, Power) 18 (M.
Zmigrodzki & M. Chmaj eds., 1995).
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allocated a second seat and its total votes are divided by 3 (2+1); thus,
with 20,000 votes, Party A has the same remaining quotient as Party B.
Now, the last seat is allocated to Party C, which wins this seat with the
highest average of 26,000 votes. In this way all seats are allocated, with
Party A receiving two seats, and with Parties B and C each receiving one.
The modification of the d'Hondt system is referred to as the formula
Sainte-Lague, and is used by the Scandinavian countries (with the
exception of Finland). This system uses only odd divisors (1, 3, 5 .... ),
which increases the chances of smaller parties. If, following this method,
we use the same example as before, we can easily observe that the
distribution of the seats changes, bringing each of four parties one seat.140
TABLE 5
Divisor 1 Divisor 3 Divisor 5
Party A ...... 60 000 (seat) 20 000 12 000
Party B ...... 40 000 (seat) 13 333 8 000
Party C ...... 26 000 (seat) 9 666 5 200
Party D ...... 24 000 (seat) 8 000 4 800
Party E ...... 10000 3333 2000
The Hare formula, named after Thomas Hare, the co-inventor of the
single transferable system (STV), involves dividing each party's vote by
the "natural" quota ( the number of votes (v) in a district divided by the
number of seats (s) allocated to this district), or by a "fixed" electoral
quota which is predetermined for all constituencies. The seats remaining
after all full quotas have been exhausted are distributed accordingly to a
system of largest remainders.
The Droop system,141 although more complicated, operates in a similar
way. It allows the calculation of the quota of votes a candidate needs for
election. The formula for the Droop quota requires dividing the total
amount of valid votes (v) by the number of seats (s) plus one, and
converting this to a percentage of votes (v).142 This exercise is
represented by the following formula: quota= v/s+l/v x 100. For
clarification, assume that hypothetical elections are held in a district in
which twenty candidates run for ten seats, and two million participating
voters are allowed to number all candidates according to their
preferences. 43 The threshold required for election will be 9.09% of the
total vote. If a candidate receives a quota, remaining votes are
transferred to other candidates in the order of the voters' preferences.
140 See Antoszewski & Albertski, supra note 86, at 235.
141 The formula is known also as the Hagenbach-Bischoff system. Both systems are
functionally identical. See JoNEs, supra note 139, at 122, 210-11 nn. 6-7.
142 For more detailed analysis, see M.A. Inman, supra note 98, at 2001-02.
143 The calculation is as follows: 2,000,000/ 10+1/ 2,000,000 x 100= 9.09%.
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After all surpluses are transferred, the candidates from the bottom of the
list who did not receive a quota are eliminated one by one, and their
votes are distributed between those above them according to the
preferences of the voters. This process goes through as many rounds as is
needed to fill the available number of seats."
It is widely assumed that the d'Hondt's formula favors larger parties,
while both the Hare and Droop systems allocate more seats to smaller
parties. As Jones wrote, "The net result is that we would expect the use
of the d'Hondt formula to lead to a lower level of multipartism and hence
a larger executive legislative contingent than the use of the LR-Hare
formula.' 145 As one can observe from the following table, the new
democracies did not show any special preferences for any one formula,
and are using all three with comparable frequency. 146 There are very few
regularities which can be observed. Poland, discouraged by the
fragmentation of her Parliament after the first election, uses in both tiers
the d'Hondt system favoring larger parties. 47 Some countries, such as
Estonia and Rumania, are using Hare's system for the lower tier, but are
trying to mitigate its effect by giving more seats to winning larger parties
in the second tier, where the d'Hondt system is applied. Bulgaria,
according to the same logic, gives more seats to larger parties on the basis
of the d'Hondt system and uses Hare's concept of strict proportionality
for individual candidates. 48 Only Slovakia and the Czech Republic use
either Hare's or Droop's systems, and Lithuania favors strict
proportionality (Droop formula), however, slightly mitigated by the use
of majoritarian system in the first round of elections. 49
"44 See Inman supra note 98, at 2001-02.
145 JONES, supra note 139, at 122-23.
146 Data regarding electoral formulas for the new democracies is limited and does
not allow for reliable report on the methods of distribution of seats in many of the
former Soviet Republics. The information in TABLE 6 was taken mostly from the
Table of Twelve Electoral Laws. See Lucky, supra note 134, at 65-77.
14 See Garlicki & Golynski, supra note 126, at 84.
148 See Lucky, supra note 134, at 65-77.
149 See id.
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TABLE 6
Threshold Electoral formulas
Bulgaria 4% (does not apply to two different formulas:
individual candidates) for parties: d'Hondt formula
for individual candidates: the
Hare formula
Czech Republic 5%; 7% for coalitions of two; two tiers, representation
9% for coalitions of three; computed on the basis of the
11% for coalitions of five Droop system
Estonia 5% two tiers: lower tier,
distribution of seats
according to the Hare model;
upper tier, distribution
according to the modified
d'Hondt model
Hungary 4% two (of three) tiers based on
PR system: lower tier,
distribution based on the
Droop model; upper tier,
according to the Hare system
Lithuania 4% one (of two) tier based on
PR system, computation
based on the Droop formula
Poland lower tier 5% for parties; 8% two tiers, in both
for coalitions; upper tier 7 % computation based on the
nationwide d'Hondt system
Rumania 3% two tiers: lower tier,
distribution based on the
Hare formula; upper tier, on
the d'Hondt system
Slovakia 5% representation according to
Ithe Hare system
D. System of Goverance"s
It is often claimed that the evolution of the doctrine of the division of
powers and its application in the political practice of several countries
contributed to the emergence of the two major political systems of presi-
dential and parliamentary government.151 Although the dichotomy of
the political systems dissipated with time into a variety of mixed models,
150 For initial description of the basic features of the presidential and
parliamentary systems, see LuDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 204-06.
151 See generally Douglas V. Verney, Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems:
Analysis of Political Systems, in COMPARATrAVE POLITICS: A READER 175-78 (Harry
Eckstein & David E. Apter eds., 1963).
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it is still valuable to think of this dichotomy as a tool for comparative
analysis.
Without entering into a detailed examination of variations of these two
major political systems, one may distinguish them by several fundamental
features. 152 The presidential system, usually associated with the Ameri-
can political experience, is characterized by a concentrated model of the
executive. The President is the sole executive and is elected directly by
the electorate as the head of state and as the head of government. 153 The
legislative branch of government is separated from the executive and
elected independently by the people for a set term of office.15 4 The cabi-
net members are appointed by the President and are subject to the confir-
mation of the legislature, but they do not sit in the legislative branches of
the government. The cabinet members can be called upon by the legisla-
ture to account for their actions but cannot be simply voted down by the
legislature's expression of lack of confidence. Similarly, the President
may call a special session of the legislative assembly or adjourn its meet-
ing, but he cannot dissolve the legislature and hold new elections. 55
In contrast, a typical feature of the parliamentary model is a dual exec-
utive system, with presidents or monarchs as heads of state playing roles
of "senior statesmen" or "supreme arbitrators," and the prime ministers
functioning as politically accountable chief executive officers. If the head
of state is a president, typically he is not elected directly by the people but
by parliaments or special electoral colleges. With the cooperation of the
parliament, the head of state appoints the head of government, who suc-
cessively appoints the ministry.' 6 In the parliamentary system, the two
branches of government, the legislative and the executive, are fused. The
ministers usually are members of the parliament and are politically
responsible to the legislature, which can vote the executive out of office
without any need for a national referendum. In some countries with the
parliamentary system, the head of state, in cooperation with the head of
government, has power to dissolve the legislature and call for an election
before the end of the parliamentary term.'57 As the fusion of the execu-
tive and the legislature, the parliament is a supreme power over its con-
stituent parts. Douglas V. Verney wrote that
the notion of the supremacy of Parliament as a whole over its parts is
a distinctive characteristic of parliamentary systems. This may seem
to be a glimpse of the obvious to those accustomed to parliamentary
government, but it is in fact an important principle, all too often for-
152 For a more elaborate list of basic features of the presidential and parliamentary
systems, see id.
"I See id. at 187.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 186-87.
156 See id. at 178-79.
"I See infra TABLE 4.
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gotten, that neither of the constituent elements of Parliament may
completely dominate the other."
15 S
Although it was often claimed that a pure parliamentary system pre-
vailed among post World War II democracies, 15 9 in fact, the supremacy of
parliaments was clearly visible only in those countries with multiparty
systems in which frequently changing coalition governments were highly
dependent on fluctuating opinions of the supporting majorities of depu-
ties. 6 In the countries with two party systems, the ruling governments
were usually able to discipline their party's parliamentary representations
to the extent of guaranteeing a good deal of stability and control over the
legislative process. Exemplified by the British experience, this system
was able to give the prime minister a formidable power. To signify this
shifting of powers within the parliament, the system in which the govern-
ment was able to gain a decisive influence has been often called the par-
liamentary-cabinet system."'
The understanding that the allocation of the excessive power in a frag-
mented parliament may contribute to governmental impotence resulted
also in the evolution of the German parliamentary system into the model
of so-called "chancellor's democracy." The stability of this system has
been improved by several devices which enhance the Chancellor to some
158 See Verney, supra note 151, at 181.
159 Arend Lijphart argued that in the group of 21 postwar democracies, 17 had
pure parliamentary systems, two had a mixed presidential-parliamentary system, one
semi-presidential system and one country (the United States) a pure presidential
system. See AREND LUPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATrERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND
CONSENSUS GovERNmENT IN TwENvTY ONE COUNTRIES 38, 69-71 (1984). This
opinion has been repeatedly cited in East-Central European literature after it was
mentioned by A. Stepan and C. Skach in the article Modele konstytucyjne a
umacnianie demokracji (Constitutional Models and Strengthening of Democracy), in
4 PANsTwo I PiAvo (State and Law) 29-30 (1994). See also references to these
opinions by J.A. Rybczynska, 0 Transformacfi Systemow Politycznych w Europie
Srodkowo-Wschodniel (On a Transformation of Political Systems in East-Central
Europe), in SwIAT I PoLsKAc XIX WmKu (World and Poland of the XXth Century)
144 (M. Zmigrodzki ed., 1996).
160 For comments on the process of the transition to cabinet government in Great
Britain, see WADE & BRADLEY, supra note 18, at 44-45; for the role of small parties
that have the potential to create coalition governments (particularly in Italy), see
Geoffrey Pridham, Italian Small Parties in Comparative Perspective, in SMALL
PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE: CoMPARATIVE AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
(Geoffrey Pridham & F. Muller-Rommel eds., 1991). See also Geoffrey Pridham, An
Inductive Theoretical Framework for Coalitional Behaviour: Political Parties in
Multidimensional Perspective in Western Europe, in COALrrIONAL BEHAVIOUR IN
THEORY AND PRAcTICE: AN INDuCrIVE MODEL FOR WESTERN EUROPE (Geoffrey
Pridham ed., 1986).
161 W. Osiatynski goes so far in the evaluation of the influence of the British Prime
Minister that he states that "in practice he has more power than the American
president." W. OsiATYNSri, TwOJA KONSTYTUCJA (Your Constitution) 82 (1997).
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degree without abandoning the parliamentary system. First of all, the
Chancellor is responsible for the policy of the federal government while
the Ministers have autonomy to act only within the limits set by the
Chancellor's general guidelines. 2 Secondly, the procedure known as the
"constructive vote of no confidence" provides that in dismissing the
Chancellor, the Bundestag must simultaneously designate a successor by
an absolute majority.'" 3 Thirdly, the German Basic Law introduced the
so-called "legislative emergency procedure" which provides that the gov-
ernment, with the support of the President and the Bundesrat, can sur-
vive up to six months without the support of the majority of the
Bundestag.164
Another hybrid or mixed system is a product of French experience and
is often referred to as a presidential-parliamentary system or semi-pre-
sidentialism.165 Although traditionally France leaned toward a parlia-
mentary democracy, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic incorporated
into the French system a number of features typical to a presidential
model. The Constitution retained a dual executive, but the President was
directly elected by the people; also the power of the executive was
strengthened and made less dependent on the Parliament. 166 The Presi-
dent's appointment of the head of the government does not require a
formal confirmation by the Parliament, although the Parliament may vote
the government out of office.' 67 Within some limits imposed on the fre-
quency of this action, the President may, in cooperation with the Prime
Minister and the presidents of the chambers of the Parliament, dissolve
the legislature and call new elections.' The President cannot veto the
acts of the Parliament but he may ask for the reconsideration of bills
162 GG, art. 65.
163 See art. 67.
164 See art. 81.
165 See Stephen Holmes, A Forum on Presidential Powers, E. EUR. CONST. REV.,
Fall 1993, at 36, 39. Maurice Duverger claimed that, in Europe, until 1989, besides
France only Portugal could meet conditions distinguishing semi-presidential system
from other systems: direct elections of the president, significant actual and
constitutional prerogatives of the president, political dependence of the prime
minister on the confidence of parliament. See Maurice Duverger, A New Political
System Model: Semi-presidential Government, 8 EUR. J. POL. RES. 165, 165-87 (1980).
The system has been also called "premier-parliamentarism." See MATIHEW SOBERO
SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 55 (1992).
166 See W. SKRZYDLO, USTROJ POLITYCZNY FRANCJI (Political System of France)
143 (1992). For a more exhaustive examination of the semi-presidential system, see
generally MAURICE DUVERGER, LE SYSTP-ME POLITIQUE FRANCAIS (1986).
167 See DRAGNICH & RASMUSSEN, supra note 19, at 275.
168 See CONSTITUTION art. 12 (Fr.) (1958) (hereinafter FR. CONST. (1958)),
reprinted in GEORGE BERMANN ET AL., FRENCH LAW 2-13 (1994).
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which he opposes. 169 As the minister cannot sit in the Parliament, the
lines of division between the executive and the legislature are less blurred
than in the parliamentary system. On the other hand, some legislative
functions may be shifted to the executive who may legislate in these areas
by decrees. As Dragnich and Rasmussen observed, "the result was a
hybrid system with elements of both parliamentary and presidential
systems. 17
0
Thus, in fact, the dichotomy dividing the Western democratic world on
a pure presidential and pure parliamentary system basis was already in
decline when the new East-Central European democracies began surfac-
ing on the political map. Still, someone expecting to find the basic fea-
tures of these two and other well-known hybrid political systems simply
duplicated in the new postsocialist constitutions would be seriously disap-
pointed. The constitutional experience of the new democracies confirms
that political systems are rarely designed on paper. They either evolve
around strong, charismatic personalities or result from a significant polit-
ical vacuum created by geopolitical circumstances. The former and latter
circumstances proved particularly true for the countries of former Soviet
dominance.
First of all, a careful commentator of the constitution-making process
in the new democracies has to observe that the early expectations of the
easy victory of parliamentarism over the presidential system in this region
only proved partially true. These expectations were based on the
assumption that the people of the postcommunist countries, disenchanted
with the uni-personal communist leadership, would view the strong presi-
dents as potential dictatorial figures, and the presidential systems conse-
quently less representative and democratic.171 It was also expected that,
at least in the former European Soviet satellite countries, the traditional
socialist concept of sovereignty of parliament would contribute to the
natural preference for parliamentary system. Stephen Holmes wrote
"Another broad pattern also strikes the eye. Parliamentarism has made
no inroads in the ex-USSR, except for the Baltic states, while full-fledged
presidentialism has found no takers in Eastern Europe, except in the ex-
Yugoslavia."' 72 Although Holmes' statement is generally correct, the
final polarization of political models in this region has not been reached
without problems, and the numerous choices made by the drafters
require a careful explanation.
Poland, with its strong traditions of "seymocracy ''1 73 was the first coun-
try to face a situation involving a choice between a presidential and par-
169 See art. 10.
170 See DRAG.icH & RASMUSSEN, supra note 19, at 274.
171 See OsrTyNsKI, supra note 161, at 81.
172 Holmes, supra note 165, at 37.
173 "Seymocracy" refers to a parliamentary system clearly recognizing the
supremacy of the legislative body over all other organs of power. Contemporary
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liamentary model, and that country's struggle with several alternative
models of democracy is most illuminating. The compromise reached in
the spring of 1989 between the Solidarity and the communist government
left the presidency in the hands of the communists. The round table
agreements, which were to guarantee the amount of control for the com-
munists, were a major departure from the parliamentary system and a
step towards a presidential one. 74 The President was granted the rights
to initiate legislative actions, to veto legislation, to dissolve the Parlia-
ment, and to impose martial law.
The direct election of Lech Walesa as the first noncommunist President
deprived the presidential model of its former rationale and strengthened
the sentiment to restore a parliamentary system.17 5 The view, however,
that depriving the Solidarity President of the same prerogatives enjoyed
by his communist predecessor would be embarrassing, gave steam to the
idea of balancing the President's power by the further "democratization"
of the Parliament.1 6 This desire resulted in the disregarding of the usual
five percent threshold for the parties' entry to the Parliament, and
resulted in the creation of the excessive system of checking and balancing
which contributed to governmental impotence.
This problem was to be remedied by the Constitutional Act on Mutual
Relations Between Legislative and Executive Powers of the Polish
Polish parliamentarism has its antecedents in the country's 17th and 18th century
history, and prevailed in the political doctrine of the early Polish II Republic,
particularly since tile restoration of Poland's sovereignty in 1918 until the adoption of
the Constitution of March 17, 1921. While the subsequent Polish Constitution of
April 23, 1935 recognized the concept of presidential superiority, in the political
thought of the Polish exile and in the Polish socialist doctrine, parliamentarism
definitely gained an upper hand. See J. Czajowski, Koncepcja Formy Rzadu w
Projektach Konstytucji Niepodleglej Rzeczypospolitej 1917-1920 (The Concept of
Governance in the Constitutional Projects of Independent Poland in 1917-1920),
in MODEL PoLsKiEGo PARLAMENTARYZMU (The Model of Polish Parliament) 11-51
(M. Grzybowski ed., 1996); M. Grzybowski, Koncepcja Parlamentu I Systemu
Parlamentarnego w Dokumentach I Wystapieniach Programowych Polskich
Ugrupowan Politycznych Okresu Okupacji I Lat 1944-1947 (The Concept of
Parliament and Parliamentary System in the Documents and Programs of Polish
Political Groupings During Occupation and Through the Period of 1944-47), in
MODEL POLSKIEGO PARLAMENTARYZMU 53-93 (M. Grzybowski ed., 1996).
174 See W. Osiatynski, Skazani na Niepodleglosc (Doomed to Originality),
GAZETA WYBORCZA (Electoral Gazette), Aug. 29, 1992. Linz and Stepan maintain
that Poland was always (even in the 1949-53 period) closer to an authoritarian than to
a totalitarian regime. See JUAN J. LINz & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF
DEMOCRATIC TRASITION AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH
AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 255 (1996).
175 See LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 153.
176 See id.
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Republic, adopted on August 1, 1992.177 The 1992 Act, referred to as the
"Small Constitution," borrowed freehandedly from the Presidential sys-
tems as well as from the German model of "chancellor's parliamentar-
ism," and established a hybrid version of "chancellor-Presidential"
system. In contrast to the German President, yet similar to the French
and American Presidents, the Polish head of state was elected directly by
the citizenry."' Again, in contrast to the prerogatives of the German and
French Presidents, but like the American President, Lech Walesa had
important checks with veto power on the Seym, the legislative chamber
of the Polish Parliament, which could be overridden by a two-thirds
majority.179 The Polish President designated the prime minister and the
ministers but their confirmation required final parliamentary approval.
The procedure for designating government had some German features
and vested in the President and the Seym in turn the right to propose
candidates for governmental positions who subsequently needed absolute
majority or plurality approval.'8 The Polish Constitutional Act, similar
to the German Basic Law, introduced the "constructive vote of no confi-
dence," which provides that in dismissing the Prime Minister, the Seym
must simultaneously designate a successor by an absolute majority.'
The Small Constitution increased the Cabinet's power, made the Prime
Minister directly responsible to the Seym,'82 and deprived the President
of the power to ask the Seym for the cabinet's dismissal. The Cabinet
could ask the Seym for the delegation of the power to legislate by
decrees. The Small Constitution also listed the Presidential acts which
required the Prime Minister's countersignature.' 83
Many commentators observed that the Small Constitution created an
excessive system of checks and balances which contributed to strained
relations between the President and the Prime Minister, and often
resulted in political deadlocks.'" The final Constitution of April 2, 1997
was intended to remedy this problem by giving preference to the parlia-
mentary system. This Constitution, similar to the classic parliamentary
models, reserves for the President the role of "the supreme representa-
tive of the Republic of Poland and the guarantor of the continuity of
177 See Constitutional Act, art. 29 (1992) (Pol.), reprinted in LUDWIKOWSKI, supra
note 1, at 514.
178 See id.
19 See art. 18, at 512.
180 See LUDWlKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 156.
181 See Constitutional Act, arts. 57-60 (Pol.) (1992), reprinted in LUDWIKOWSKI,
supra note 1 at 518-19.
182 See arts. 57, 66, at 518-19.
183 See arts. 46-47, at 516-17.
184 See LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1 at 157; see also Osiatynski, supra note 174, at
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State authority."' 5 Still, in contrast to traditional parliamentarism, it
provides that the President be directly elected by the Nation for five
years.' 86 The President was stripped of some of his previous prerogatives.
For example, to override his veto, the Seym now needs only a three-fifths
majority vote in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of
deputies.'87 The Small Constitution also provides the President with the
right to appoint a provisional government in the event that a Council of
Ministers has not been appointed by the Seym, or if the Presidential nom-
inees do not get a vote of confidence.' 88 Under the 1997 Constitution,
the President can only shorten the term of the Seym and order elections
to be held.1' 9 The position of the government has been enhanced by the
removal of the provision of the Small Constitution providing that in the
event of the Seym passing a vote of no-confidence to the government-in-
office without at the same time choosing a new Prime Minister, the Presi-
dent had the discretion of either accepting the resignation of the Govern-
ment or dissolving the Seym.'90 Under the 1997 Constitution, the failure
of the resolution specifying the name of a new candidate for Prime Minis-
ter simply extends the life of the old cabinet; the text strips the President
of the power to shorten the term of office of the Seym in such an event. 91
With all these changes, the 1997 Constitution still represented a hybrid,
"semi-chancellor" system that, following the German model, strength-
ened the authority of the government, leaving, however, in the hands of
the Polish President, power significantly greater than the power of his
German counterpart.
The position of the presidents in some other East-Central European
countries supporting the parliamentary form of government also varied.
The presidents of Albania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia
were elected by parliaments or electoral colleges.' 92 The first President
of Estonia was elected directly by the people, but the final Constitution
provides for an option to elect the President either by Parliament or by
an "electoral body," composed of members of Parliament and represent-
185 See KONSTYTUCJA [Constitution] art. 126(1) (Pol.) (1997) (hereinafter POL.
CONST. (1997)).
186 See art. 127(2).
187 See art. 122(5).
188 Constitutional Act, art. 66 (1992) (Pol.), reprinted in LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note
1, at 520.
189 See POL. CONST. (1997) art. 155(2).
190 See Constitutional Act, art. 66 (1992) (Pol.), reprinted in LUDWIKOWSKI supra
note 1, at 520.
191 See POL. CONST. (1997) art. 158.
192 See ALB. CONST. (Interim 1991) art. 25, reprinted in LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note
1, at 322; OSTAVA CR [Constitution] art. 54 (Czech. Rep.) [hereinafter CZECH REP.
CONST.]; A MAGYAR KOZATARSASAG ALKOMANYA [Constitution] art. 29/A
[hereinafter HUNG. CONST.]; OSTAVA [Constitution] art. 101(2) (Slovk.) [hereinafter
SLOVK. CONST.].
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atives of local government. 193 Some other parliamentary republics, such
as Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Romania established direct Presidential elec-
tions.' 94 The countries supporting the parliamentary form of government
allow the presidents to submit legal acts passed by parliaments for recon-
sideration but, although resulting in a second vote, no qualified majority
is needed to adopt these acts.195 The right to dissolve the parliament is
usually limited: for example, the Romanian President can dissolve Parlia-
ment if it does not give a vote of confidence for the formation of the
government twice within sixty days of the first request,196 and in Hungary
the President can dismiss the Parliament only if it withdraws confidence
in the government four times in a year or fails to elect a Prime Minister
within forty days.' 97 In most of the countries favoring parliamentarism,
the chief executive officers are appointed by the presidents with approval
of parliaments.' 98 They are responsible before and recalled by the legis-
lative bodies. The power to designate the prime minister, however, may
be entirely vested in the parliament (the Hungarian case), with only the
right to appoint ministers upon the proposal of the prime minister
reserved for the president.199
Some of the republics opting for the presidential system come danger-
ously close to an authoritarian or simply dictatorial model of governance.
This trend is particularly striking in Belarus, where President Alexander
Lukashenko clearly intends to subordinate to himself all other powers.
The Belarusean Constitution was amended by the referendum of Novem-
ber 24, 1996.200 The amendments replaced a unilateral legislature with a
bilateral parliament in which the President can nominate one third of the
senators.20' This provision, combined with the Presidential right to dis-
solve solely the legislative chamber20 2 creates some suspicion that the
President may try to get rid of the representative assembly and legislate
with the assistance of the subordinated Senate. The President reserved
for himself the right to initiate and veto legislation.2 °3 Constitutional
193 See POsmA.us [Constitution] art. 79 (Est.) [hereinafter EST. CONST.].
194 See BULG. CONST. art. 93; KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 78 (Lith.)
(hereinafter LrnH. CONST.); RoM. CONST. art. 81.
195 See supra TABLE 4.
196 See RoM. CONST. art. 89.
197 See HUrG. CONsT. art. 28.
198 See, e.g., LrrH. CONST. art. 84.
199 See HUNG. CONST. art. 33.
200 The original Constitution of the Republic of Belarus was adopted on March 15,
1994 and amended accordingly to Lukashenko's draft at the end of 1996. See Gilbert
H. Flanz, Introduction to Belerus Constitution vi, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
CouNTREs OF T=E WORLD (Gilbert H. Franz ed., 1997). The text of the original
Constitution of 1994 is reprinted in LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 333-50.
201 BELR. CONST. art. 91.
202 See art. 93.
203 See arts. 99, 100.
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amendments vetoed by the President can be adopted only by a three-
fourths majority of all the members of the Parliament. The President
issues decrees and regulations binding on the territory of the whole coun-
try which do not require any governmental countersignature. °4 The
President is the head of the state and government; he appoints and recalls
ministers and only his nomination of the Prime Minister has to be
approved by Parliament. 2 5 Article 88, requiring the vote of three-
fourths of the Senate in order to impeach the President, is practically a
dead letter.
Similarly, the President of Ukraine was once both head of state and
head of government; the prime minister was only a deputy "subordinated
and accountable" to the President.20 6 The Ukrainians clearly borrowed
from the American Presidential system. The executive and the legislature
were separate and independent. To terminate the President's tenure, the
bicameral Parliament had to impeach the President.2 7 With the excep-
tion of the situation when the all-Ukrainian referendum called by the
Parliament failed to terminate the tenure of the head of the state, the
President cannot dissolve the national assembly.20 8 Although the Consti-
tution adopted on June 29, 1996 made concessions towards the parlia-
mentary system, they were crafted halfheartedly. The Constitution
abolished the second chamber of Parliament and provided for dual exec-
utive power and for the ministerial countersignature of some of the Presi-
dential decrees; the Presidential power to annul acts of ministers has been
retained with some limitations.20 9 The President was permitted to dis-
solve Parliament; however, the assembly was vested with the right to
impeach the President only in the event of the commission of serious
crime or treason.210
The trend to vest in the president a combined power of head of the
state, highest executive officer, and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces is clearly visible in three republics of Central Asia and Transcauca-
sia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan. The presidents in these
states are elected directly by the people, have the right of veto which can
be overridden by a two-thirds majority of the legislature and can issue
decrees. 2 11 They head cabinets, and with the approval of parliaments,
appoint the prime ministers and ministers accountable to them.212 The
model of checks and balances, which the drafters of the constitutions of
204 See art. 85.
205 See art. 106.
206 See LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 90-91.
207 See id. at 9 I.
208 See id.
209 See UKR. CONST. arts. 75, 106, 106(16).
210 See arts. 90, 111.
211 See KAz. CONST. arts. 76, 78(2), 79; KYRG. CONST. arts. 44, 46, 48.
212 See KAZ. CONST. art. 85; KYRG. CONST. art. 46.
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these countries attempted to follow, does not allow the presidents to dis-
solve parliaments, nor parliaments to impeach the presidents.
The Constitution of the Russian Federation of December 12, 1993 was
also a product of the constitutional melting pot. The drafters attempted
to duplicate the American system of checks and balances but ended up
with a model which combined both French and American features.213
The Russian President has a right to veto laws, which the French Presi-
dent lacks,214 and the right to dissolve Parliament, which has not been
vested in his American counterpart. 215 In contrast to the American Presi-
dent, the Russian President is not the head of state and of the govern-
ment, but his power to control the executive is stronger than that of the
French President. The Presidential appointment of the Prime Minister is
subject to the consent of the State Duma, but the President appoints and
dismisses his deputy and federal ministers and decides on the resignation
of the whole government.216 The President may approve the noncon-
fidence resolution of the State Duma and dissolve the legislative ,body
after the second vote of no-confidence.217 The President issues decrees
and executive orders which do not require any ministerial countersigna-
ture and repeals the decrees and orders issued by the government.21" The
President has legislative initiative, and can call referenda and impose a
state of emergency, requiring only immediate notification of Parlia-
ment.219 The impeachment of the President is possible only on the basis
of charges of high treason or grave crimes, and after the combined actions
of the State Duma, the Federation Council, the Supreme Court and the
Constitutional Court.220 'At this moment it is still too early to say
whether the constitutional "mixing" in the countries once part of the
Soviet Union was the result of chaotic political bargaining or the product
of cunning political calculation which attempted to disguise autocratic
tendencies under a semi-democratic shield of Presidential systems.
The following chart shows the results of the constitutional blending in
the area of governance in the republics opting for parliamentary and
Presidential systems.
213 See LUDWnKOWSK, supra note 1, at 67. For the text of the 1993 Russian
Constitution, see KONST. RF (1993), reprinted in LuDwiKowsKI, supra note 1, at 552.
214 See art. 107.
215 See arts. 109, 111, 117.
216 See art. 83.
217 See art. 117.
218 See art. 115.
219 See arts. 84, 88.
220 See arts. 84, 88, 93.
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E. Mechanisms of Judicial Enforcement of the Constitutions2 '
As one of the greatest novelties of the postsocialist constitutionalism,judicial review stands on par to such concepts as the division of powers,
political pluralism and the doctrine of itat de droit, a law-based state.
Socialist doctrine traditionally did not recognize the need for judicial
review; the correctness of the representative organs of the people could
not be subject to the control of appointed judges. Even in the states
where some judges were elected, the conviction prevailed that the infer-
ior courts could not review the decisions of the superior parliaments.222
In the 1960s, however, some socialist jurists began cautiously to argue
that no power was immune from corruption, and that the decisions of the
peoples' organs should be coherent and subject to careful evaluation.
Thus, in the early 1960s, attitudes towards judicial control began to
change, and in 1963, Yugoslavia began setting up constitutional courts.223
Later, in the mid-1980s, Poland adopted the statute on the constitutional
tribunal.224 With the fall of communism in East-Central Europe, the
selection of a model of judicial control applicable to the legal traditions of
the postsocialist countries became one of the most controversial issues in
the constitutional debates across this region. The drafters of the new con-
stitutions primarily considered two well-tested models of constitutional
review.
The so-called American decentralized model was rooted in the concept
of constitutional supremacy.225 The idea that a constitution should be
drafted, not by regular legislative bodies, but by special conventions to
which the people delegate a constituent power is an idea that originated
in the United States. The American Constitution also introduced a rela-
tively rigid process of constitutional amendment. The rigid character of
the U.S. Constitution, combined with the principle of its supremacy,
implies the right of all courts to disqualify any repugnant laws. The
decentralized system has developed from the concept of constitutional
checks and balances. This system implies that one power is balancing,
221 In the constitutional literature of the East-Central European countries, the
institution of judicial review is most profoundly analyzed in ANNA LUDWIKOWSKA,
SADo-,vNICrwo KONSTYTUCYJNE w EUROPIE SRODKOWO-WsCHODNIEJ W OKRESIE
PRZEKSZTALCEN DiEMOKRATYCZNYCH-STUDIUM POROWNAWCZE (Judicial Review
In East-Central Europe in the Period of Democratic Transformations-A
Comparative Study) (1997).
222 See VYSHINSKY, supra note 79, at 339-40; S. Rozmaryn, Kontrola
Sprawiedliwosci Ustaw (Control of the Legality of Statutes), in 11-12 PANSTWO I
PRAwo (State and Law) 866 (1946). For more commentary, see Ludwikowski,
Judicial Review in the Socialist Legal Systems: Current Developments, supra note 2, at
91.
223 See id. at 94.
224 See id. at 99.
225 See LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 212-13.
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controlling, and supplementing the functions of the other, although no
single power can completely subrogate the other.226 This decentralized
and concrete system vests the regular courts with the power to nullify the
law with regard to a concrete dispute involving concrete parties.22 7 The
validity of the courts' decision could be extended on other cases through
the principle of stare decisis.
The second model of judicial review considered for adoption was the
so-called Austrian model. This model was introduced by the Austrian
Constitution of 1920 and is often described as a centralized and abstract
model.228 In contrast to the American model, the power of review in the
concentrated system is vested either in a supreme court or in a special
court.229 Review can be initiated through an independent action raising
an abstract issue of constitutionality.
In addition to these two models, the drafters of the East-Central Euro-
pean constitutions had to take into account the French model, which is
often referred to as a preventive, or less correctly, a political system of
review.230 The right to review legislation in France, is vested in a special
body, the Conseil Constitutionel (Constitutional Council), composed of
nine members appointed for nine years by the President of the Republic,
the President of the Assembly, and the President of the Senate. Former
Presidents of France are made ex-officio members of the Council.231 The
Constitutional Council must review organic laws (the main implementing
laws) before their promulgation.232 In addition, the Council reviews
other laws if submitted before promulgation by the President of the
Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of one of the parliamentary
226 See id. at 213.
227 See MAURO CAPPELLET1M, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN CONTEMPORARY WORLD 58
(1971); ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDIcIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATiVE LAW 125-82
(1989).
228 See Ludwikowski, Constitution Making in the Countries of Former Soviet
Dominance: Current Development, supra note 1, at 255.
229 See BREwER-CARiAs, supra note 227, at 183-222.
230 See MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTIrU-
TIONAL LAW 10 (1979). As the right of review in France is vested in a special quasi-
judicial body, it was often classified as the "external political" type of review. This
classification leads to the confusing impression that the Council is just an extension of
the legislative organ through which legislators imposed some additional political
checks on themselves. In fact, the Council is highly independent institution with a
great deal of autonomy which members are appointed in the way showing no major
discrepancy to the constitutional courts. What truly distinguishes the Council from
the constitutional tribunals is the limited and preventive character of review which
can only be instituted before the legislative process is completed.
231 See FR. CONST. (1958) art. 56.
232 See art. 61.
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chambers, or by any sixty members of the National Assembly or
Senate.2 3
The German mixed review model, which is basically a centralized sys-
tem with some features of both the concrete and abstract models, also
attracted the attention of the drafters of new constitutions.23 4 The scope
of review of the German Federal Constitutional Court is impressive. The
Court can be reached through five major channels.235 First, the Court has
the power of constitutional review over the rights and duties of federal
organs.236 Secondly, it has a right of abstract review over the formal and
material compatibility of federal or Land law (the law of the states that
are federal components of Germany) with the basic law and the compati-
bility of Land law with federal law.237 The court's review can also be acti-
vated by the federal government, a Land government, or by one-third of
the Bundestag members.238 Thirdly, the Court has the right of concrete
review. If any court finds unconstitutional a law whose validity is rele-
vant to a concrete adversary action, the proceeding before that court
must be stayed, and a decision obtained from the federal constitutional
court.23 9 Fourthly, the federal constitutional court rules on the compati-
bility of political parties with fundamental democratic principles recog-
nized by the Basic Law.240 Finally, the court hears the constitutional
complaints of individuals whose rights have been violated by public
authority.24' The Constitutional Court pronounces whether the law is
incompatible with the Basic Law, or whether the Constitution of the
Land is valid or void; its decisions are published in the Official Gazette
and are binding upon all governmental organs and courts.242 It is widely
believed that the mixed character of the German system, and especially
individuals' direct access to the court, enhances the democratic character
of a traditional centralized model.
Searching for a structural design to serve as a pattern for several
states, one can discern a tendency common to all drafters of the laws on
constitutional courts in the new democracies - a reluctance to follow the
American decentralized model. Several factors contributed to the adop-
tion by the new democracies of one of the well-tested European models.
First, the American decentralized model is rooted in the concept of con-
233 See id.
234 See LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 214.
235 See GG art. 93(1)1.
236 See id.
237 See id.
238 See art. 93(12.
239 See art. 100 (1) (stating that if the Constitution of the Land is held to be
violated, the decision on the compatibility of the Land law to that Constitution should
be obtained from the Land court competent for constitutional disputes).
240 See arts. 21(2).
241 See art. 93(1)4a.
242 See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 227, at 213-14.
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stitutional supremacy, which hardly appealed to the drafters from the
countries where the relatively flexible constitutions were adopted and
amended by parliaments. Second, the diffused or decentralized system
has developed from the concept of constitutional checks and balances.
Thus, it did not fit the political philosophy which recognized superiority
of parliaments and inferiority of all other state organs, including courts.
Third, the decentralized model of judicial review developed in the United
States, a common law country, where the higher courts' decisions on the
constitutionality and validity of laws have been generalized through the
principle of stare decisis. It was a common concern among civil law coun-
tries, which do not recognize legal precedence, that laws might be dis-
qualified as unconstitutional by some courts, and yet still held valid by
others. Fourthly, the diffused system requires judiciaries' qualifications
usually lacked by most of civil law judges who are often appointed to
judicial positions at the very early stages of their legal careers.
The general preference for the centralized model meant that the new
constitutional courts, as organs with the exclusive right to review the con-
stitutionality of laws, received the status of "constitutional institutions,"
bodies established by the constitutions and to which constitutional provi-
sions granted special functions, independent of those of other state's
organs. The relations between the constitutional courts and other consti-
tutional institutions are thus neither clear nor uniform, signified by the
different location of the provisions on constitutional courts in the struc-
ture of the new constitutions. Some of the basic laws give the constitu-
tional courts a separate status, others incorporate them in the structure of
other judicial institutions. For example, the Constitution of Romania
reserves for the Constitutional Court Title V, a provision clearly sepa-
rated from Title III on Public Authorities which includes chapters on Par-
liament, the President, the Government, Public Administration and
Judicial Authority.243 In the Constitution of Hungary, the chapter on the
Constitutional Court has been placed between the chapter on the Presi-
dent and the Ombudsman, and before the one on the Government. 2 "
The Polish Constitution of 1997 reserves for the Constitutional Tribunal a
subchapter in Chapter VII on Courts and Tribunals; the Constitutions of
the Czech and Slovak Republics make the Constitutional Court a part of
Judicial power, and the Constitutions of the Russian Federation, Kazakh-
stan and Kyrgyzstan regulate the position and functions of the Constitu-
tional Courts in the common chapter on the Courts and Justice, or in the
chapter on the Judiciary.245
The selection process of justicies of the Constitutional Courts also war-
rants attention. Most of the new democracies provide that both the legis-
lative and executive organs should cooperate in selecting the justices, yet
243 See ROM. CONST. arts. 140-45.
244 See HUNG. CONsT. art. 33/A.
245 See KONsT. RF arts. 125-29; KAz. CONST. art. 95; KY-G. CONsT. arts. 79-82.
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the competence of these organs vary. In some countries, the appointing
functions are reserved almost exclusively for the legislatures, as in the
case of Hungary. 6 In Poland the justices are individually selected by the
Seym (legislative chamber of Parliament), and the President and Vice-
President of the Tribunal are appointed by the President from a pool of
candidates proposed by all justices of the Tribunal.247 In other countries,
the appointing prerogatives are relatively proportionally distributed
among several organs. In Bulgaria, one-third of the justices are elected
by Parliament, one-third are appointed by the President and one-third
are appointed by a joint meeting of the justices of the Supreme Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Administrative Court." 8 The Constitutional
Court itself elects its President.249 Romania follows the French model
and splits the power to appoint justices between the President and the
two chambers of Parliament, each having the right to choose one-third of
the Court's membership. 250
Significant discrepancies can be found in the process of selection ofjustices in the former Soviet republics. In Russia, the President nomi-
nates candidates who are appointed by the Federation Council (federate
component of Parliament).251 In Belarus, the Constitution reserves for
the President the power to appoint half of the justices. 252 In Lithuania,
the justices are chosen by Parliament from a pool of candidates, one-third
of whom are nominated by the President, one-third by the Speaker of the
Parliament and one-third by the President of the Supreme Court.253
The scope of the reviewing activity of the Constitutional Courts varies
as well. All the Constitutional Courts are vested with the right to control
abstract acts submitted for the Court's review, but only some of them
have the right to institute this control preventively, or before the acts are
given legal force. In Romania, which follows to some extent the French
model of constitutional review, the Constitutional Court has the exclusive
right of preventive control of the laws. 54 In Poland, Estonia, and Hun-
gary, the President, before signing the bill may ask the Constitutional
Court to judge on its conformity with the constitution. 5 The drafters of
the constitutions in other new democracies took the position that the pre-
246 See HUNG. CONST. art. 32/A.
247 See POL. CONST. (1997) art. 194.
248 See BULG. CONST. art. 147.
249 See id.
250 See ROM. CONST. art. 140.
251 See KONST. RF art. 128.
252 The other half is appointed by the Council of the Republic. See BELR. CONST.
art. 116.
253 See LITH. CONST. art. 103.
254 See ROM. CONST. (1991) art. 144.
255 See POL. CONST. (1997) art. 122(3); EST. CONST. (1992) art. 107; HUNG. CONST.
32/A.
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ventive review interferes with the legislative process, and stripped their
constitutional courts of the right to review laws before promulgation.256
The new constitutions differ in their regulation of the right of the con-
stitutional courts to review international agreements, or to disqualify the
national laws on the basis of their collision with higher general principles
of international law. The preventive right to review the consistency
between international treaties and the constitution is vested in the consti-
tutional courts by the constitutions or the implementing laws of Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Russia.257 The Czech Constitution allows the Constitu-
tional Court to disqualify the law for its inconsistency with international
agreements.258 In Poland, the Court adjudicates on the conformity of
international agreements to the Constitution, and all other legal acts to
international agreements;259 a judgment of the Polish Constitutional
Court on the non-conformity of the legal act to an international agree-
ment is grounds for re-opening proceedings if the legal act was a basis on
which a legally effective judgment of a court, or a final administrative
decision, was issued.260 In Lithuania, the Parliament has the final deci-
sion in the cases where the Constitutional Court rules on the conformity
of international agreements with the Constitution.
261
The constitutional drafters in all the new democracies, except for the
Ukraine, tried to incorporate into the postsocialist model of judicial
review elements of concrete control which could be triggered by an
actual legal controversy between the parties.262 This type of control
involves regular courts in the process of review in a way that the judges,
who are bound by the constitution and the statutes, have a positive obli-
gation to apply in their decisions legal acts which are constitutional; they
may not be allowed to invalidate the acts which they recognize as illegal
or unconstitutional, 2 6 but must apply only those norms which are com-
patible with the constitution and statutes. Within this general concept,
256 See infra TABLE 9.
257 BULG. CONST. art. 149(4); Statute on the Constitutional Court, art. 1 (1989)
(Hung.); KoNsT. RF art. 125(d).
258 The doctrine of these states gives binding international agreements precedence
over the law. See CZECH REP. CoNsT. art. 10.
259 Referring to the review of the constitutionality of international agreements, the
1997 Constitution of Poland does not use the term "ratified international
agreements," repeatedly used in other provisions. It was interpreted in this way that
the Constitutional Court has only the right to review the constitutionality of
international agreement before their ratification while it reviews the consistency of all
other acts with ratified international agreements. See POL. CONsT. art. 188.
260 See art. 190(4).
261 See Lrni. CoNsT. arts. 105, 107.
262 See UiR. CONsT. art. 124.
263 European constitutionalism usually reserves the term "review of legality" to
the control of substatutory norms, while "review of constitutionality" usually means
control of the compatibility of the statutes with the constitution.
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one can still find several variations. Some constitutions state that thejudges are "subject only to the Constitution and statutes, '264 and leave
for the doctrine the conclusion that the judges have a positive obligation
to disqualify in their decisionmaking process acts, which are incompatible
with higher legal norms. Some other constitutions in an unambiguous way
declare that "the courts supervise the legality of legislation. ' 265 Some
constitutional provisions clearly try to distinguish between the evaluation
of "legal regulations" (which usually means substatutory acts) and evalu-
ation of "the law" (the statutes). For example, the Czech Constitution
provides that "a judge is bound by the law in making a decision; he is
authorized to evaluate the compatibility of another legal regulation with
the law" but "if a court comes to the conclusion that the law that is to be
used to resolve the matter is inconsistent with a constitutional law, it shall
submit the matter to the Constitutional Court., 266 In the first instance,
the judge can disqualify the substatutory act (regulation, administrative
decision, ordinance) as a valid basis for his decision; in the second case,
being bound by the statute, he can only stay the proceeding and request
the Constitutional Court for the review of constitutionality of the chal-
lenged law. In some countries (i.e. Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland
under the 1997 Constitution267), the Constitutional Court's review can be
triggered by any court, and in some other countries (i.e. Bulgaria, Poland
until 1997),268 this right is reserved to the supreme or appellate courts.
In some of the new democracies, the decisions of the constitutional
courts on the constitutionality of the law are final and the acts recognized
as unconstitutional are void from the day of the enactment of the ruling(i.e. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland under the 1997 Constitu-
tion, Russia).2 69 In some other countries (i.e. Poland in 1985-1997,
Romania), only the rulings on the legality of substatutory laws are bind-
ing, but the decisions on the constitutionality of statutes can be overruled
by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the legislative chamber.2  In
Slovakia, the Constitutional Court rules that the challenged acts are
"voidable" or "not void," which means that the organ which issued the
act should bring it "into harmony with other laws" within six months after
the act ceases to be effective. In Lithuania, the Parliament reserves for
itself the final decision in actions on compatibility of international agree-
264 POL. CONST. art. 178(1).
265 BULG. CONST. art. 120.
266 CZECH REP. CONST. art. 95.
267 See id.; EST. CONST art. 152; POL. CONST. art. 193.
268 See BULG. CONST. art. 150; Statute on Constitutional Tribunal, arts. 11(1), 25(1)
(Pol.) (1985).
269 See BULG. CONST. art. 151; CZECH REP. CONST. art. 89; HUNG. CONST. art. 32/
A; POL CONST. art. 190(1); KONST. RF art. 125.
270 See Statute on Constitutional Tribunal, art. 7(3) (Pol.) (1985); ROM. CONST. art.
145.
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ments with the Constitution, in the violation of election laws and in
impeachment proceedings."'
A controversial issue arising during the drafting of the new democra-
cies' constitutions was the extension of the constitutional courts' jurisdic-
tion over the right to hear individual complaints. On the one hand,
hearing individual constitutional complaints gives private persons direct
access to the constitutional courts, and is widely recognized as the most
democratic feature of judicial review. On the other hand, its introduction
overburdened numerous European constitutional courts, comprising over
ninety percent of their cases. 2 Until recently, this institution made slow
but steady inroads in the practice of the new European constitutional
courts. The number of complaints submitted to the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court forced this Court to impose some controls on its own
agenda. 7  The Court began checking whether all formal requirements
(deadlines, exhaustion of other remedies, direct impact of the violation
on the individual situation of the petitioner, binding character of the chal-
lenged decision, etc.) were being met by the applicants, and finally
decided that the violations of social and economic rights cannot be sub-
ject to the Court's review. The other countries which incorporated the
institution of constitutional complaints into the practice of their courts,
followed suite and began carefully verifying the meritorious character of
all submissions 4.27 At the tine of this writing, constitutional complaints
are permitted by the constitutions of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Poland (after 1997).275 The Constitution of Russia, following an old
socialist pattern of promising something without a clear explanation of
enforcement mechanisms, states that "the decisions of... state organs ...
may be appealed against in a court of law, '27 s and mentions that the Con-
stitutional Court may proceed from complaints about "violation of consti-
271 See LITH. CONST. art. 107.
272 For example, constitutional complaints, added in 1951 to the jurisdiction of the
German Federal Constitutional Court, comprise some ninety five percent of its cases.
In 1969, the statutory provision was given constitutional status by the introduction of
Sec. 4a into article 93 of the German Basic Law. See WALTER F. MuRnHY & JOSEPH
TANENHAuS, CoMI ARATrVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARimEs 29
(1977).
273 For more detailed analysis of this problem, see LUDNvIKOWSKA, supra note 221,
at 109.
274 Slovakia's Constitution states that a constitutional complaint can be filed only
when "basic rights and liberties [were violated] unless decisions on the protection of
these rights and liberties are within the jurisdiction of another court." SLOVK. CONST.
art. 127. The Polish Constitution excludes asylum cases from the Constitutional
Court's review. See POL. CONST. art. 79(2).
275 See CZECH REP. CONST. art. 87(d); SLOVK. CONST. art. 127; POL. CONST. arts.
79(1), 188(5).
276 KONST. RF art. 46.
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tutional rights and freedoms of citizens,, 277 but it does not explain who
can file these complaints and does not list the right to hear individual
complaints among the competencies of the Court.278 The right to appeal
the decision of administrative organs which abridge or limit a citizen's
right is mentioned in article 40 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan 279 and
article 82(8) of the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan.28° The Constitution of
Romania provides that
a person who has suffered damage as a result of the violation of one
of his rights by a public authority, through an administrative act, or
as a result of the failure to have a request resolved by the legal dead-
line, is entitled to have the right in question recognized and the act
revoked and to receive compensation for the damages;281
The Constitution, however, does not explain which court will hear these
complaints and concludes that "the conditions and limitations for the
exercise of this right will be determined by statutory law., 282
Besides functioning as the organs of judicial review of constitutionality
of the laws, the constitutional courts in the new postcommunist democra-
cies play several other roles. For example, the Constitution of Bulgaria
vests in the Constitutional Court the broad right to interpret the Consti-
tution.28 3 The Hungarian Constitutional Court can do so only upon the
request of the President, the Government, Parliamentary Commissions,
the First President of the Supreme Court, the Procurator General and the
Head of the Supreme Office of Control.21 The Constitution of Slovakia
provides that the implementing laws will specify the competence of the
Constitutional Court to interpret constitutional laws.285 The other consti-
tutional courts (perhaps with the exception of Ukraine) do not have this
function clearly listed by their constitutions. Until the adoption of the
new Constitution of 1997, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was allowed
to interpret statutes at the request of the President, the Prime Minister,
the President of the Supreme Court, the President of the Supreme
277 See art. 125.
278 The right to submit the constitutional complaint is more clearly provided by
article 96 of the Russian Statute on Constitutional Court. Some commentators claim
that the submission of complains to the Russian Court is possible only with the
endorsement of regular courts and after the exhaustion of all administrative
remedies. See eg., LUDWIKOWSKA, supra note 221, at 110.
279 KAZ. CONST., art. 40.
280 KYRG. CorNsT., art. 82(2).
281 ROM. CONsT. art. 48.
282 See id.
283 See BULG. CONST. art. 149(1).
284 See Matthias Hartwig, The Institutionalization of the Rule of Law: The
Establishment of Constitutional Courts in the Eastern European Countries, 7 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 449, 462 (1992).
285 See SLoVK. CONST. art. 128(1).
"MIXED" CONSTITUTIONS
Administrative Court, the Ombudsman and the Procurator General;
286
the new Constitution dropped this function from the list of the Court's
prerogatives.
Following the practice of the German and Austrian Constitutional
Courts, some constitutional courts of the new democracies are allowed to
decide on disputes between central and local governments. In East-Cen-
tral Europe, this power has been vested to some extent in the Constitu-
tional Court of Bulgaria 7 and in the constitutional courts of Albania and
Hungary.288 The Czech and Slovak Constitutional Court may hear dis-
putes regarding the powers of state bodies and territorial self-administra-
tion bodies but only "if they do not fall by law under the jurisdiction of
another organ law.",28 9 The Russian Constitutional Court can resolve dis-
putes on a horizontal level within federal and state administrative power
structures and on a vertical level between federal organs of power and
state organs of power. 29 The other constitutional courts do not operate
in this function.
Last but not least, some constitutional courts participate in impeach-
ment processes (i.e. Bulgaria,291  Czech Republic, 292  Hungary,
293
Romania,294 Russia,295 Slovakia 296), can delegalize political groupings
and parties (i.e. Bulgaria,297 Czech Republic, 298 Poland, 299 Romania,30
0
Slovakia301), may rule on the legality of elections and referenda (i.e.
Albania, 02 Bulgaria,30 3 Czech Republic, 304 Romania, 05 Slovakia306), sig-
286 See LuDwnmowsKA, supra note 221, at 93.
287 See BULG. CONST. art. 149(3).
288 See Joan Davison, America's Impact on Constitutional Change in Eastern
Europe, 55 ALB. L. REv. 793, 803 (1992); Ethan Klingsberg, Safeguarding the
Transition, E. EUR. CONST. REv., Spring 1993, at 44, 46.
289 See CZECH REP. CONST. art. 87(1)(k). See SLOVK. CONST. art. 126.
290 See KONST. RF art. 125.
291 See BuLG. CONST. art. 103(3).
292 See CZECH REP. CONST. art. 65(2).
293 See HuNtr. CONST. art. 31/A(5).
294 See ROM. CONST. art. 144(f).
295 See KONsT. RF. art. 93(1).
296 See SLOVK. CONST. art. 107. In Poland, the Constitutional Court rules on the
incapacity of the President. See POL. CONST. art. 131(1).
297 See BuLG. CONST. art. 149(5)..
298 See CZECH REP. CONsT. art. 87(1)0).
299 See POL. CONST. art. 188(4).
300 See RoM. CONST. art. 144(i).
301 See SLOVK. CONST. art. 129(4).
302 See ALB. CONST. (Interim 1991) art. 24(7).
303 See BULG. CONsT. art. 149(6).
304 See CZECH REp. CONST. arts. 87(e), (f).
305 See RoM. CONST. art. 144(d).
306 See SLOVK. CONST. arts. 129(2), (3).
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nal the gaps in the law (i.e. Hungary and Poland before 1997)307 and have
legislative initiatives (Russia, Belarus until 1996).311
307 See LUDWIKOWSKA, supra note 221, at 122.
308 See BELR. CONST. art. 130, KONST. RF art. 104.
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III. CONCLUSIONS
The main goal of this Article was to report on the complexity of the
constitution-making process in the new postsocialist democracies. The
analysis of the selected common fundamental constitutional features of
the newly adopted constitutions warrants several observations.
1. Confrontation allows the discovery of a comparable amount of simi-
larities and differences between the constitutions subject to examination.
It confirms the initial thesis of this Article that the constitutions adopted
in the region of former Soviet dominance have some common features, in
the sense of a typical constitutional fabric, but do not have any common
core which would distinguish them from other constitutions as was the
case of the socialist constitutional stereotype. There is no single post-
socialist constitutional model and there is no single constitution or consti-
tutional system which served as a prototype for the constitutional drafters
from the new democracies. Thus, if modeling means searching for a
structural design for prospective constitutional-making, the new constitu-
tions were not "modeled."
2. It is often noted that modem constitution-making resembles tech-
niques of social "engineering" rather than of "modeling." This thesis
must be modified. An engineer's work requires some level of exactitude;
his freedom to experiment is limited. The engineer may build different
bridges, but without exposing his users to real danger, he cannot test his
product's durability in practice. In contrast, the constitutional drafters
quite frequently seemed to believe that testing the constitutional institu-
tions in operation was something absolutely normal and acceptable.
Their work resembles "gardening" rather than "engineering." The con-
stitutional institutions are not constructed from separate and well-tested
components into a smoothly operating machine, and are not transplanted
like organs into accomplished social organisms. Rather, they are like
seedlings carefully chosen from different gardens and implanted, piece by
piece, into living, constantly changing vegetation composed of rules,
norms, and institutions. The "new gardens" do not resemble traditional
French or British parks, they have a "mixed" character, blending together
features produced by different tastes, cultures, and styles.
3. The eclectic character of the new constitutions justifies commenta-
tors' concern over their consistency. Consistency is one of the basic fea-
tures of a good constitution. The term implies that constitutional
provisions gel in such a manner that their rationale is fully explainable,
and that they mesh with other components of the constitutional system.
To be consistent, the drafters of the constitutions would have had to
acquire a deep comparative knowledge of the countries from which con-
stitutions they borrowed. Many drafters, however, did not acquire this
knowledge. The number of incoherences is striking. The guarantees for
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"diversity of ownership [and] free initiative of all economic subjects" 1'
neighbor declarations that the economy is regulated by the state and
coincide with typical socialist statements that "economic initiative of
juridical and physical persons cannot develop contrary to social interests
and should not impair the security, freedom and dignity of man."311 Sur-
prisingly, the concept of checks and balances was married to the idea of
separated organs of power; the principle of supremacy of parliament was
artificially combined with a presidential system of governance; 312 a
bicameral legislature was established without any clear rationale; and a
preventive (French) model of judicial review was adopted without any
respect to the fact that the particular country lacks a well-developed sys-
tem of administrative courts.313 These kinds of inconsistencies were
avoided by countries such as Bulgaria, Poland and Russia. The constitu-
tional drafters of these countries were able to restrain their tendency to
blend different constitutional principles and instead borrowed, to some
extent, from recognized constitutional models.
4. Transparency is another important feature of a good constitution.
Reasonable commentators may differ as to the meaning of a constitu-
tional provision, but they should not conclude that a constitution's clauses
are indeterminate. A constitution may have a built-in flexibility but not a
built-in vagueness. The drafters of the law should be able to distinguish
between flexibility and uncertainty. The former justifies the very exist-
ence of constitutional courts, while the latter encourages these courts to
arbitrarily take over the power to legislate.
The new constitutions are relatively rigid, and their drafters, notwith-
standing warnings that each transitory period requires a certain degree of
flexibility, seemed to believe that their products would stand unchanged
for a relatively long time.3 14 Apparently, they were surprised to find that
the rigidity, meaningless in the socialist constitutions, made the new basic
laws hardly amendable.315 This observer believes that the drafters of the
new constitutions, surprised by the rigidity of their products, were
inclined to compensate through some artificially inserted indeterminacy.
, This resulted in awkward statements, appearing to signify the impor-
tance of some social problems but, in fact, providing no command or hav-
310 See ALB. CONST. (Interim 1991) art. 10.
311 See id.
312 See KAZ. CONST. art. 84.
313 See comments on the Romanian Constitution in LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1,
at 128-29.
314 See L. Garlicki, Normy Konstytucyjne Relatywnie Niezmienne, (Constitutional
Norms Relatively Unchangeable), in CHARAKTR I STRUKTURA NoRM KONSTYrUcJI
(Character and Structure of the Constitutional Norms) 137-55 (1997).
315 The fact that the socialist constitutions, regardless of the level of rigidity, were
amended at will by the communist controlled legislatures, petrified the illusion that
the built-in constitutional rigidity was of little significance.
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ing any real substance, such as, "citizens of the Republic are obliged to
pay taxes and fees in accordance with legislation,3 16 or " the religion...
may be taught in schools. 3 17
In the opinion of the drafters, flexibility also meant that details of the
constitutional norms or principles should be left to the regulations of the
statutory law. This approach, used repeatedly by all of the constitutional
drafters, would make sense if the constitutional norms declared princi-
ples, rules or directives explaining a social value or a pattern of socially
desirable behavior, but left the detailed regulation of the procedure or
the explanation of what the value or pattern was in practice, to the imple-
menting laws. Thus, using the example cited above, it may be common-
place to state that citizens have to pay taxes, but this mere statement does
not necessarily enable a declaration of the rules of the distribution of tax
revenue between the federal government and the federal components of
the state, even if details will be provided by the statutes. The point here
is that references to the implementing laws cannot be used simply to
delay the formulation of basic constitutional principles.
The proper level of generality in constitution-making is always disputa-
ble, and some of the new constitutions or constitutional drafts were fre-
quently criticized for being either too detailed, such as the Ukrainian
draft of June 10, 1992, or too concise and lapidary, such as the Russian
Constitution of 1993.18 The commentators of the Polish Constitution(adopted in 1997) reported that it endlessly refers the citizens to the stat-
utory regulations.319 In reality, the proper level of generality cannot be
measured by the number of references to the implementing laws. In
addition to the regular descriptions of legislative actions, the references
to "the other laws" usually have double folded rationale: they either
declare that the constitutionally guaranteed rights can be abridged only
by the laws and not by administrative decisions, or state that only the
laws can explain, mitigate or expand the limits of the authority of the
state's organs through detailed regulations. The function of the so-called
316 KYRG. CONST. art. 25.
317 POL. CONST. art 53(4). The full provisions reads: "The religion of a church or
other legally recognized religious organization may be taught in schools, but other
peoples' freedom of religion and conscience shall not be infringed."
318 In fact, most new constitutions are of moderate length-150 to 170 articles. See
LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 194.
319 In fact, the objection is not quite confirmed by the comparative analysis. The
German Basic Law, comprised of 146 articles, ever slightly shorter than the Polish
constitution (243 articles) refers its readers to "further regulations of the law" in 47
instances, amounting to approximately 31% of constitutional articles. The Polish text
does so 87 times, which means that the reference to the statutory laws can be found in
35% of its articles, but the relatively short Constitution of Kazakhstan (131 articles)
does so only 25 times, amounting to 19% of the articles. The number of references to
"the detailed regulations of the statutory laws" does not make the Polish Constitution
less crisp or clear than the Constitution of Kazakhstan.
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"second generation" laws is to implement, not to pronounce the basic
constitutional rules. This difference was not always clear to the drafters
of the new constitutions who frequently made their products indetermi-
nate, vague and complicated for readers untrained in constitutional
interpretation.320
5. Are the newly adopted constitutions complete? The defining of a
mature and complete constitution is controversial, and usually results
with projecting the single paradigm of "a good constitution." Instead of
looking for an ideal constitutional model, one may check the fabric of
some recently adopted basic laws. The review of twenty national consti-
tutions adopted over the past fifteen years321 shows that the examined
constitutions have many common components: a preamble; general prin-
ciples of state organization; fundamental rights and freedoms; a system of
state governance including sections on central and local governments,
sections on judicial structures and judicial control of the constitutions, a
section on emergency measures; and some miscellaneous or transitional
provisions. Some of these common features seem to be more essential
than others. For example, few of the constitutions under review contain
preambles or sections on local government and judicial review, but virtu-
ally every constitution includes sections on general principles of state
organization, fundamental rights, central government, the judiciary, and
procedures for amendments.322
From this perspective, the constitutions of the postcommunist democ-
racies reveal no glaring abnormalities, yet still show some differences.
While the communist constitutions had descriptive and lengthy preambles
explaining the mission of communism, the preambles of the new constitu-
tions of the former communist region have been shortened or omitted
altogether. Without exception, all of the new constitutions have sections
on fundamental rights and freedoms, but only two former Soviet repub-
lics (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan) retain the old fashioned subchapters on the
citizens' duties.
Some constitutional acts, such as the Ukrainian and Lithuanian, as well
as the draft of the Azerbaijan Constitution, contain special chapters on
320 See Yeltsin's Speech to the Nation Introducing the New Draft Constitution, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, SU/1843/C, Nov. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, BBC File.
321 The constitutions studied were adopted from 1982 to 1991 and the results of the
search were analyzed in LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 193-96. The analyzed
constitutions were from highly diverse countries throughout widely diverged parts of
the world. They were the constitutions of: Afghanistan (1990), Algeria (1989), Brazil
(1988), Burkina Faso (1991), Chad (1989), China (1982), Columbia (1991), Haiti
(1987), Honduras (1982), Laos (1991), Liberia (1984), Namibia (1990), Nepal (1990),
The Netherlands (1983), Nicaragua (1987), Nigeria (1989), Sierra Leone (1991),
Suriname (1987), Thvalu (1986), and Thrkey (1982).
322 An exception to this is the Chinese Constitution which contains no amendment
provisions.
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civic society, which usually cover state regulation of societal relationships
with a focus on ownership rights. Several countries-Belarus, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Poland, Romania and, Slovakia-have separate sections on
economy, finance, and the state budget.
All of the constitutions examined have sections on horizontal and verti-
cal distribution of powers. These sections, usually the most controversial
and drafted amidst the toughest political struggles, are relatively well
developed in all of the constitutions. Judicial control of the constitution-
ality is now also a standard element of the reviewed constitutions. Still,
the coverage of mechanisms of legal enforcement varies. Most of the
constitutions and drafts, with the exception of the Slovak and Estonian
constitutions, contain separate chapters on constitutional courts or consti-
tutional council,;.
To the disappointment of the readers of the Estonian Constitution, the
single basic law which vests the right of constitutional review in the
Supreme Court makes very few references to the institution itself. 23
Although the Hungarian Constitutional Court is one of the most ener-
getic institutions of the new democracies, its constitutional status is
explained by the addition of a single article to the old and heavily
amended constitution. Also, the new constitutions of the Czech and
Slovak Republics are the products of artificially accelerated drafting.
They do not lack any major sections but are indecisive in substances, a
problem which the drafters could have corrected by implementing
laws.324 The following statements offer a few examples of provisions
which contribute to the impression of the temporary or incomplete char-
acter of these constitutions: (1) "the law may provide that the Supreme
Administrative Court rather than the Constitutional Court shall decide
"1325on .... ; or (2) the Court decides if the controversies "do not fall
under the jurisdiction of another court ....
6. The real difference between Communist and Western constitutions
does not stem from the "declaratory" character of many of the Commu-
nist constitutional provisions or from the lack of judicial enforcement of
the constitutions. The difference stems from the clear contrast between
socialist theory and practice, which made many socialist legal concepts
fictions. Despite numerous well orchestrated social constitutional discus-
sions and grassroots revisions in the amending process, Socialist constitu-
tions were produced by the highest echelons of the Communist party, and
as such, did not carry any respect from the public.127 This last statement
prompts a question as to whether the new constitutions of postsocialist
regions are the product of a viable social compromise.
323 See EST. CONST. arts. 149, 152.
324 For more comments, see LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 1, at 163-75.
325 See CZECH REP. CONST. art. 87.
326 See SLOVK. CONST. art. 127.
327 For more commentary, see LUDWIKOVSKI, supra note 1, at 36-38.
"MIXED" CONSTITUTIONS
A response to this question must be accompanied by some reserva-
tions. Democratic constitutionalism made genuine inroads into the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states. This is
exemplified by the fact that in Albania, the poorest country of Eastern
Europe, some democratically flavored constitutional drafts, favored by
President Barisha but criticized by the opposition, failed to generate
appropriate parliamentary majority.328 The drafts were also rejected by a
referendum, confirming that even in a poor and politically tense state
such as Albania, the opposition can block the constitution-making pro-
cess if it does not satisfy the expectations of major social elites."9'
Unlike in Albania, the Russian Constitution was adopted after the dis-
solution of the Parliament, which had been blocking the President's
attempts to adopt a new Constitution. Even though Russia was able to
confirm (by the referendum of July 12, 1993) a Constitution after many
compromises, numerous political groups opposing President Yeltsin criti-
cized the Constitution as a "granted" charter, rather than a democrati-
cally adopted one.3"'
Much like the Russian Constitution, the Ukrainian Constitution of
September 25, 1996 was also a product of a compromise between the
President and Parliament. The document was, however, finally adopted
by Parliament under the threat of submitting the Presidential draft to a
nationwide referendum.331 The manipulation of an unexperienced elec-
torate was probably most clearly visible in Belarus where seventy percent
of the participants of the referendum of November 24, 1996 blindly sup-
ported President Lukaszenka's draft granting him almost dictatorial
power.3 32 In contrast to the former East-Central European Soviet satel-
lite states and the Baltic republics, where the constitutions were adopted
basically to sanctify the democratic changes occurring in those regions,
constitutions in other Soviet Republics were adopted or "granted" to
328 See L. Simini, Albania: Berisha Seeks New Albanian Constitution, REUTER
TE cLiNE, REUTER NEWS SERVICE-CIS AND EASTERN EUROPE, Nov. 10, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Txprim File.
329 See Constitution Watch, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Spring 1995, at 3.
330 For more comments on Yeltsin's constitution, see id. at 56-67. See also Lee
Hockstader, Yeltsin Threatens to Yank TV Time from Opponents, WASH. POST, Nov
27, 1993, at A21. Packaging the referendum on a new constitution with parliamentary
elections sparked attacks by Yeltsin's opponents that he intended to divert the
attention of the electorate from his attempt to establish a Presidential system in
Russia to the kind of milder social and economic issues usually discussed during
parliamentary campaigning.
331 See Preliminary Analysis of the Separation of Powers Provisions of the Draft
Constitution of Ukraine, CEr. & E. EUR. L. INnTATIE (ABAICEELI Washington,
D.C., May 13, 1996).
332 See BELR. CONsT. arts. 79-89.
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legitimize the regimes in power.3 33 The future of these acts remains to be
seen.
7. How durable will these constitutions be? Americans are especially
proud of their constitution's longevity. Like the Americans, the drafters
of the new constitutions believe that, as supreme legal documents, their
constitutions will endure the test of time. On the one hand, most consti-
tutions are amendable and this ensures that they will not have to be
drafted "de novo." On the other hand, even the most rigid constitutions
are replaceable. From this perspective, the new East-Central European
constitutions are especially vulnerable. All of these constitutions are in a
sense "interim" constitutions adopted in a transitory period. This is espe-
cially true for those which were adopted to legitimize political elites
rather than to establish a new order.
To summarize, the products of the postcommunist constitutional melt-
ing pot must be evaluated with moderate enthusiasm. The constitutional
drafters of these constitutions learned to utilize the benefits of the era of
information and borrowed heavily from all available sources. The cour-
age of the creator, however, does not always match his skills. The com-
pleteness, coherence and clarity of these constitutions are still imperfect,
and their longevity will most likely vary. At one end of the spectrum,
some of these constitutions are mature basic laws which were the result of
almost a decade of political bargaining. Some other constitutions, how-
ever, were hastily adopted, evincing the marks of unprofessional constitu-
tional craftsmanship. Although this conclusion is not surprising or
revealing, it must be stated with emphasis. Political "gardening," like all
other novelties, requires a deep comparative knowledge, which at least at
this moment can be acquired only through the process of arduous
attempts learning from mistakes.
"I See Hockstader, supra note 330; New Russian Constitution is Adopted: Official
Results on Referendum, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Dec. 21, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BBC File.
